Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization

Abstract

Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally-through a collective risk dilemma-the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues. INTRODUCTION Public good games (PGGs) provide abstractions of many real-world problems wherein personal and shortterm interests of multiple players are in conflict with societal, long-term interests (Perc et al, 2013, 2017; Ramamoorthy, 2013). Participants in such games can contribute voluntarily to a common good, which can, once established, be accessed without restrictions by all, thus even those that did not contribute. Rational selfish behavior stipulates that it is best to not contribute; yet such decision would be detrimental, as a group is better off when all contribute. These games not only serve as a good model for social public benefits (e.g., social security, retirement funds) but are also recurrent in many other collective endeavors,

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