Time, Singularity and the Impossible: Heidegger and Derrida on Dying

Abstract

This article focuses on Heidegger’s reflection on death in Being and Time, on the question of whether death can be mine, on what the connection between death and mineness can tell us about schizophrenia, and on the relation between Heidegger’s talk of death and mineness and Derrida’s talk of mourning and mineness.

Baudrillard and Heidegger: Between Two Deaths

“…Jenny Yates Hammett (1977: 169) explains that '[t]hose sides of life turned away from us, unilluminated, belong to the whole. Death is the other side of the circle of Being '. In answer to the question as to how Dasein can 'own' that which is 'not yet', Rafael Winkler (2016) proposes to read Jemeinigkeit as 'a principle of singularisation. [.…”

“…In answer to the question as to how Dasein can ‘own’ that which is ‘not yet’, Rafael Winkler (2016) proposes to read Jemeinigkeit as ‘a principle of singularisation. [.…”

“….] Dasein is not an individual, an indivisible or simple atom, whether soul, substance, ego or person’ (Winkler, 2016: 211). Rebecca Comay (1990: 73) also notes how Heidegger tears Dasein away from any substance-ontology (the ‘ekstatic’ exteriority of Ek-sistenz takes the place of the stability of Sub-stanz , etc.…”