Time-Invariant Angle-Range Dependent Directional Modulation Based on Time-Modulated Frequency Diverse Arrays

Cheng, Qi; Zhu, Jiang; Xie, Tao; Luo, Junshan; Xu, Zuohong

doi:10.1109/access.2017.2772246

“…In fact, the Fig. 2 in [25] and the associated discussions clearly shown that the secure reception region propagates at the speed of light in range domain. However, the authors claimed that if the array excitation vector changes accordingly, the secure region does not propagate.…”

Section: Secure Reception Regions 'Propagate' In Range As Time Elamentioning

confidence: 88%

Can Frequency Diverse Array Prevent Wireless Eavesdropping_for_techRxiv.pdf

Yuan¹,

Narbudowicz²

2019

Preprint

1

3

0

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In this paper, the concept and recent development of exploiting frequency diverse array (FDA) and its variants for the physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully examined. Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative simulations, the authors argue that the investigations performed in some recent works did not reveal one critical issue facing the real-world applications, and system models established and used before were based on an unrealistic assumption, i.e. that the legitimate and eavesdropping users at different ranges sample the signal waveforms at the same time instant. This misunderstanding results in conclusions that are misleading. The authors aim to take the first step to divert research efforts and rectify the previous problematic analyses. The authors prove that the FDA cannot secure a free-space wireless transmission in range domain, because the previously claimed ‘secure reception region’ propagates in range domain as time elapses.

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“…Based on the above analyses, the conclusions reached in some previous FDA works [5]- [15], [25] are unreliable.…”

Section: Secure Reception Regions 'Propagate' In Range As Time Elamentioning

confidence: 89%

Can Frequency Diverse Array Prevent Wireless Eavesdropping_for_techRxiv.pdf

Ding¹,

Narbudowicz²

2019

Preprint

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, the concept and recent development of exploiting frequency diverse array (FDA) and its variants for the physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully examined. Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative simulations, the authors argue that the investigations performed in some recent works did not reveal one critical issue facing the real-world applications, and system models established and used before were based on an unrealistic assumption, i.e. that the legitimate and eavesdropping users at different ranges sample the signal waveforms at the same time instant. This misunderstanding results in conclusions that are misleading. The authors aim to take the first step to divert research efforts and rectify the previous problematic analyses. The authors prove that the FDA cannot secure a free-space wireless transmission in range domain, because the previously claimed ‘secure reception region’ propagates in range domain as time elapses.

show abstract

“…• [28]: In fact, the Fig. 2 in [28] and the associated discussions clearly shown that the secure reception region propagates at the speed of light in range domain.…”

Section: Secure Reception Regions 'Propagate' In Range As Time Elamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on the above analyses, the conclusions reached in some previous FDA-DM works [5]- [17], [28]- [31] are incomplete and the assumption on receivers' sampling time instant needs to be carefully examined. It is also worth noting that some works on FDA beampattern synthesis suffer a similar limitation [32]- [34], i.e.…”

Section: Secure Reception Regions 'Propagate' In Range As Time Elamentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Limitation of Range-Domain Secrecy Using Frequency Diverse Arrays

Ding

¹

,

Narbudowicz

²

,

Goussetis

³

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, the concept and recent development of exploiting frequency diverse array (FDA) and its variants for the physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully examined. Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative simulations, the authors realize that the investigations performed in some recent works overlooked one critical issue facing the real-world applications, and system models established and used before were based on a limited assumption, i.e. that the legitimate and eavesdropping users at different ranges sample the signal waveforms at the same time instant. The limitation of this assumption results in their studies inconclusive. The authors aim to take the first step to divert research efforts and rectify the previous incomplete analyses. The authors argue that in the current technology base the FDA cannot secure a free-space wireless transmission in range domain, because the previously claimed 'secure reception region' propagates in range domain as time elapses. INDEX TERMS Directional modulation, frequency diverse array (FDA), physical-layer wireless security, radiation patterns.

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Time-Invariant Angle-Range Dependent Directional Modulation Based on Time-Modulated Frequency Diverse Arrays

Cited by 53 publications

References 28 publications

Can Frequency Diverse Array Prevent Wireless Eavesdropping_for_techRxiv.pdf

Can Frequency Diverse Array Prevent Wireless Eavesdropping_for_techRxiv.pdf

Can Frequency Diverse Array Prevent Wireless Eavesdropping_for_techRxiv.pdf

Physical Limitation of Range-Domain Secrecy Using Frequency Diverse Arrays

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