Time, foreknowledge, and alternative possibilities

Abstract

In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are ‘ontologically necessary’. In defending Anselmian freedom we argue that our ordinary intuitions do not support Johnson's case and that Anselmian freedom is compatible with deliberation.

Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence

“…5151Edwards (1754/1957: Part II, section XII) attributes this view to certain Arminians, but unqualified endorsements are difficult to find. Talbott (1986: 457), for example, says that God's beliefs depend on our actions in a “quasi“ causal sense; Green and Rogers (2012: 158) say God's beliefs are caused by our actions “in some broad sense”; and Mavrodes (1984: 142) says that there is no reason to not endorse the causal view (without actually endorsing it).…”