Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction

Petrosjan, Leon A.; Zaccour, Georges

doi:10.1016/s0165-1889(01)00053-7

Cited by 242 publications

(147 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…5,6 Even bilateral 1 See e.g., Germain, Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw (2003) or Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003) for the case of stock pollution game and Calvo and Rubio (2013) Barrett (1998) breaks down the process of treaty making into five stages: pre-negotiation, negotiation, ratification, implementation and renegotiation. Congleton (2001) identifies four phases of IEAs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Anticipated International Environmental Agreements AbstractConsider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types of IEAs that aim to reduce pollution stock in the environment. IEA type 1 sets a level of emissions, IEA type 2 and IEA type 3 set a percentage and a uniform cut vis-à-vis the business-as-usual policy respectively. IEA type 4 sets the policy that maximizes future joint benefits of the signatories. We show that all of these agreements reach their goal in the long run, but the intended benefits of these IEAs can potentially be offset by the anticipatory noncooperative response of the signatories, leading to an environmental degradation in the short run. Which IEA is preferable depends on the targeted level emissions during the phase of cooperation. When this target is above a certain threshold, welfare under IEA type 1 is larger than under IEA type 2 which is larger than under IEA type 3. Moreover, the highest level of welfare that can be attained under IEA type 1 is above the highest level of welfare achieved by any one of the other three IEAs.JEL-Codes: Q530, Q540, Q580, Q590.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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“…The dynamic framework allows us to examine the impact of a change in the natural rate of decay of the stock pollutants on the stability of an IEA. Also, it is an interesting extension from a theoretical perspective since Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2011) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) show that countries'free riding inof abatement. 5 The United States signed the Protocol on November 12, 1998.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the dynamic setting, we use the seminal transboundary pollution game model in Dockner and Long (1993) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992). In contrast with van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001), we have taken the ratio of emissions to output as exogenously given.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Benchekroun

Chaudhuri

2012

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. We further show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We examine a reduction in the emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants.JEL classi…cations: Q20, Q54, Q55, Q58, C73.

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“…A new concept of the characteristic function construction was introduced by L. Petrosjan and G. Zaccour in [2] for environmental and other problems where players out of coalition wouldn't form an anticoalition to harm their efforts. Following Petrosjan and Zaccour we suppose that the leftout players stick o their feedback Nash strategies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We calculate Shapley Value for the model of pollution cost reduction [2] and for the model of nonrenewable resource extraction [1].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shapley Value in Cooperative Differential Games with Random Duration

Shevkoplyas

2010

Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games

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We consider n-person differential game with standard dynamic equation:But we suppose that the game has a random duration because it seems to be more realistic to expect the end of the game at the random time instant T [3]. Let T be a random variable with distribution probability function F (t). So, if we consider cooperative form of the game, the players would seek to maximize the total expected payoff. We get non-standard problem of dynamic programming:

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Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction

Cited by 242 publications

References 9 publications

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

The Shapley Value in Cooperative Differential Games with Random Duration

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