TIME and TAXES

Thomson, Procter; Goldstein, Henry

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1971.tb01616.x

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Among those who have contributed to the discussion on this topic are: Brown (1948), Musgrave (1959, pp.336-46), Bennett and Harcourt (1960), Smlth (1963), Samuelson (1964), Wright (1963Wright ( ,1964, Gaffney (1967), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Johansson (1969), Thomson and Goldstein (1971), Sodersten (1972), and Coen (1975). A useful point of departure is provided by the following:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Progressive Income Taxes, Tax-Favoured Investments and Investment Behaviour

Chisholm

1976

Australian Journal of Management

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The current debate on the taxation of business income highlights the need for the tax to not distort investment decisions.A tax on business income that permits immediate expensing of all outlays (including investment outlays) is shown to be a tax on pure profits, whereas a true income tax that allows the write-off of economic depreciation (Samuelson tax) is shown to be a tax on both pure profits and the 'normal' interest earned on investments. Neither tax distorts investment decisions, though the latter distorts consumption/investment decisions.Under existing progressive income taxes, which roughly approximate the Samuelson type of tax but which provide tax-concessions to favoured investment activities, pre-tax rates of return on the favoured investment activities will tend toward equilibrium levels below those for non-favoured investments.The tax-favoured investment areas eventually will be dominated by high tax-bracket investors.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Progressive Income Taxes, Tax-Favoured Investments and Investment Behaviour

Chisholm

1976

Australian Journal of Management

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“…1 The ability of [M(acac) n ] compounds to form molecular complexes with σ-acceptor I 2 , 2-8 is one property that has been taken as evidence for such delocalization. 1 It was proposed that these complexes are similar to those formed by aromatic hydrocarbons with I 2 and that [M(acac) n ] compounds behave as π-electron donors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Charge-Transfer Complexes of Some Metal 2,4-Pentanedionates with Picric Acid as π-Acceptor

Refat¹

2005

Journal of the Korean Chemical Society

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“…7 7 This is the factor omitted by Thomson and Goldstein (1971) in their defense of the neutrality of income taxation. …”

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confidence: 99%

A Simple General Test for Tax Bias

Gaffney

2006

American J Econ Sociol

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The paper infers the biasing effects of taxes from their differential effects on the present values of rival uses for given tracts of land. After-tax wage rates, interest rates, and commodity prices are exogenous, hence not affected by taxes, which are therefore all shifted to land rents and values. The effects are differential among rival uses, hence change their ranking in the eyes of the landownermanager. Most taxes downgrade the highest use into a lower use, inducing quantum leaps away from higher and better uses into lower and worse uses. The paper uses forestry as an allegory for all land uses. It compares yield taxes, property taxes, income taxes, and site value taxes. It finds that a change from the first three to the site value tax would induce quantum leaps from lower to higher uses of land.The method here is to infer the biasing effects of taxes from their differential effects on present values of rival uses for land. A local tax jurisdiction is an open economy. Our simplifying premise is that arbitrage equalizes all after-tax rates of return on new investing, at levels determined in world capital markets. Labor is free to come and go, and product prices are set in world markets. Given those premises, all taxes are shifted to land, the only factor fixed in an otherwise open economy; tax jurisdictions are defined as fixed areas of land.Using these premises lets us devise a simple test for tax neutrality. 1 Treat net present value derived from a land improvement as a residual, and impute this residual value to land. Find algebraically the ratio of after-tax land value to before-tax land value. If the ratio is simply (1 − t) (where t is a tax rate), the tax is neutral-the highest and best use of land after tax is the same as that before tax. 2 The ratio (1 − t)

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TIME and TAXES

Cited by 4 publications

References 3 publications

Progressive Income Taxes, Tax-Favoured Investments and Investment Behaviour

Progressive Income Taxes, Tax-Favoured Investments and Investment Behaviour

Charge-Transfer Complexes of Some Metal 2,4-Pentanedionates with Picric Acid as π-Acceptor

A Simple General Test for Tax Bias

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