Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers

Abstract

The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.

Structural and Institutional Determinants of Influence Reputation: A Comparison of Collaborative and Adversarial Policy Networks in Decision Making and Implementation

“…Although it is widely acknowledged that final decision control is the most important resource in policy-making, authors largely agree that this control can be exchanged for influence resources such as information, public support, or technical expertise (Coleman 1986;Choi and Robertson 2013;Henning 2009;Knoke et al 1996;Leifeld and Schneider 2012;Henning 1999, 1998). The possession of these influence resources considerably facilitates direct access to decision making and policy design and increases actors' reputational power (Beyers and Braun 2013;Heaney 2014;Raub and Weesie 1990).…”

Defending the status quo across venues and coalitions: evidence from California interest groups

“…First, the realization of the group's "preferred outcome" was measured empirically as a very rough proximate for capturing the (perceived) advocacy success (Bernhagen et al 2014). Nevertheless, the "preferred outcome" variable goes one step further than the dependent variables used previously by Beyers and Braun (2013), who capture "venue access" and "advocacy intensity" of groups. Of course, venue access is a precondition for any policy influence (Eising 2007) and thus deserves analytical attention.…”

“…Previous SNA studies looking at the position that groups occupy within political networks active in one venue demonstrate that well-connected groups tend to display higher access to policy-makers (Beyers and Braun 2013) or even higher influence on policy outputs (Box-Steffensmeier 2014;Heaney and Lorenz 2013). The added value of the present study is to apply the SNA approach across the entirety of the policy process.…”

studying policy advocacy through social network analysis

“…For instance, an IG might be the leader of a coalition, occupy a 'bonding position' and represent the coalition's homogeneous policy preferences. By contrast, an IG linking different coalitions (i.e., bridging or brokering position) is able to stimulate information exchanges between heterogeneous policy positions and, so doing, produce new ideas about problem-solving or even negotiated agreements (Beyers and Braun, 2013;Ingold and Varone, 2012). In one word, SNA offers many opportunities to assess the strength of strong ties within a coalition, and the strength of weak ties between coalitions (Carpenter et al, 1998).…”

“…In the European context, Beyers and Braun (2013) look at how IGs coalition membership impacts their respective access to decision makers. They measured both strong ties between IGs belonging to the same coalition and weak ties bridging more distant IGs that are members of alternative coalitions.…”