Thucydides' Realistic Critique of Realism

Contextualism and Universalism in Thucydidean Thought

“…20 For example, Gilpin (1984), Lebow (2003) and Bedford & Workman (2001). 21 For an example of the latter, see Ahrensdorf (1997), who reads Thucydides as an essentially modern theorist whose realist analysis reaches very different conclusions from contemporary Realism. 22 These are the key concerns discussed in Floyd & Stears (2011), especially the papers by Kelly, Graham and Hampsher-Monk. theory, whether in his intellectual project (the study of recurrent patterns in human life without falling for the idea that there are fixed laws of history or society, as Williams and Geuss have suggested) or in his rhetorical technique (the use of dramatic narrative to make the issues at stake manifest, making the reader a spectator).…”

Thucydides and Modern Realism

“…Crane (1998) finds that central realist assumptions can be traced to Thucydides, which in his particular iteration includes anarchy, the importance of organized social groups, rationality, the drive to maximize power, and the inherent amorality of international politics. Alternatively, Johnson (1994) argues that the prominence of individuals in the narrative and speeches challenges realist assumptions of state centricity, while Peter Ahrensdorf (1997) contests whether the Hellenic international system is in fact anarchic, given the Greeks could not in principle know if there is a divinely enforced moral order. The positing of rationality does not correspond with Stephen Forde's (1995) reading of the behavior of a number of actors in the History ; at some level, states like Melos and Sparta act on the basis of a specific conception of justice or piety, and do not respond rationally to international conditions.…”

“…By arguing that they “will not go without their share of fortune from the Gods” (5.104), Melos regards the Gods as effectively serving as a source of supra‐state moral and religious order, equivalent to an overarching political authority or public agent that regulates political relations between cities by punishing or rewarding just and unjust behavior. Melos' interest in moral behavior is not for its moral worth, but justice used instrumentally as a form of self‐help (Ahrensdorf 1997:244) 25…”

“…The first argument does not address any of the premises of structural realism; whether the decisions of domestic actors are instrumental or rational from the perspective of their private interests is not relevant to the international consequences or outcomes of those decisions. The second argument is particularly interesting, because it directly challenges the premise of anarchy; as Ahrensdorf (1997:244) asks, “insofar as realists contend that justice has no power in the real, anarchic world of international politics … how can the realists know that this assumption is true?” The Athenian response in 5.105 is that Melos' belief in its own divine favor is contingent on a specific understanding of divinity; according to Athens, because it was not the first to “lay down” the law that humans are under an “innate compulsion to rule wherever empowered,” it is morally exonerated for acting in terms of necessity and interest. Moreover, it is evident throughout Thucydides' narrative that while people's subjective religious beliefs matter in terms of motivating or impacting political behavior, the Gods themselves do not play an active role in human affairs.…”

“…Athens did not consider removing Alcibiades until after the religious crimes, and his alleged association with the Mysteries reinforced public angst about his leadership. According to Ahrensdorf (1997:257), Athens' response to the incident “reveals the power of both their pious fears and their pious hopes, fears and hopes that overwhelm their capacity to pursue their self‐interest effectively.” 30…”