Through the Newsfeed Glass: Rethinking Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers

Abstract

In this paper, we will re-elaborate the notions of filter bubble and of echo chamber by considering human cognitive systems’ limitations in everyday interactions and how they experience digital technologies. Researchers who applied the concept of filter bubble and echo chambers in empirical investigations see them as forms of algorithmically-caused systems that seclude the users of digital technologies from viewpoints and opinions that oppose theirs. However, a significant majority of empirical research has shown that users do find and interact with opposing views. Furthermore, we argue that the notion of filter bubble overestimates the social impact of digital technologies in explaining social and political developments without considering the not-only-technological circumstances of online behavior and interaction. This provides us with motivation to reconsider this notion’s validity and re-elaborate it in light of existing epistemological theories that deal with the discomfort people experience when dealing with what they do not know. Therefore, we will survey a series of philosophical reflections regarding the epistemic limitations of human cognitive systems. In particular, we will discuss how knowledge and mere belief are phenomenologically indistinguishable and how people’s experience of having their beliefs challenged is cause of epistemic discomfort. We will then go on to argue, in contrast with Pariser’s assumptions, that digital media users might tend to conform to their held viewpoints because of the “immediate” way they experience opposing viewpoints. Since online people experience others and their viewpoints as material features of digital environments, we maintain that this modality of confronting oneself with contrasting opinions prompts users to reinforce their preexisting beliefs and attitudes.

Beliefs in misinformation about COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are linked: evidence from a nationally representative survey (Preprint)

“…Rather, they may become a belief system infused with moral convictions, which tends to be fixed and rigid [25,26]. Belief rigidity has been connected to echo chambers [8,27], conspiracy thinking [28], and polarization [25,29,30]. Hypothesis 4: Belief rigidity explains both BM-C and BM-U.…”

Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence

“…To the extent that the epistemic bubbles phenomenon is indeed happening (some studies seem to show that Internet users also find and engage with standpoints different from their own—for an overview of criticisms, see [ 54 ]), these bubbles and the resulting reduction of voices are intrinsically bad for democracy. This is so both according to a thin ideal of democracy (voters need choice and hence need to be exposed to different political voices) and especially according to a thick ideal: discussion in a deliberative and participatory democracy, for example, or agonistic struggle, are hardly possible if there is only one voice.…”

Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness

“…Munroe contends that Nguyen's conceptual analysis of echo chambers and epistemic bubbles is inordinately cognitive and does not sufficiently emphasize the affective dimensions of social epistemic structures. See FigàTalamanca and Arfini (2022) for a critical analysis of online echo chambers and online epistemic bubbles in particular.…”