Threshold aggregation of the three-graded rankings

Aleskerov, Fuad; Yuzbashev, Dmitriy; Yakuba, Vyacheslav

doi:10.1134/s0005117907010122

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Let us add to this that the non-response rule was clearly expressed, written on the ballots and voters were reminded of it by volunteers. The data confirmed the voters did indeed understand the rule: a substantial number of them never used the lowest grade and only focused on higher grades-since, indeed, to do otherwise would involve uselessly ticking a box, whether the lowest or median grade, whereas the same purpose could be served by doing nothing 2 .…”

Section: Experimental Design For Comparing Grading Scalesmentioning

confidence: 57%

Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting

2020

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Many voters seem to appreciate the greater freedom of expression afforded by alternative voting rules; in evaluative voting, for example, longer grading scales and/or negative grades seem desirable in so far as, all other things being equal, they allow greater expressivity. The paper studies to what extent the behavior of voters, and the outcomes of elections, are sensitive to the grading scale employed in evaluative (or "range") voting. To this end, we use voting data from an experiment conducted in parallel with the 2017 French presidential election, which aimed to scrutinize the negative grade effect and the length effect in grading scales. First, this paper confirms that the introduction of a negative grade disfavors "polarizing" candidates, those whose political discourse provokes divisive debate, but more generally we establish that it disfavors major candidates and favors minor candidates. Second, under non-negative scales, polarizing candidates may be relatively disfavored by longer scales, especially compared with candidates who attract only infrequent media coverage and who are little known among voters. Third, longer scales assign different weights to the votes of otherwise equal voters, depending on their propensity to vote strategically. Overall, we observe that the benefits of the expressivity provided by longer scales or negative grades need to be balanced against the controversial advantage these give to minor candidates, and their tendency to undermine the principle that each vote should count equally in the outcome of the election.

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Section: Experimental Design For Comparing Grading Scalesmentioning

confidence: 57%

Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting

2020

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“…Since this rule is invariant under strictly positive affine transformations, the result of the computation does not change if we replace the (1, 0, −1) scale by e.g., (2, 1, 0). 3 The first case is supported by Hillinger (2004, Section 3, and 2005), who claimed "It is a common experience that in addition to feeling positive or negative about candidates or issues, we may also feel neutral." The second one is the subject of a study by Baujard and Igersheim (2011).…”

Section: A Characterization Of the Disandapproval Voting Rulementioning

confidence: 98%

“…Ju (2005) deals with social choice rules mapping each profile into a single alternative. Aleskerov et al (2007) axiomatize the 'threshold rule'. Balinski and Laraki (2007) propose 'majority judgment'.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dis&approval voting: a characterization

Alcantud

Laruelle

2013

Soc Choice Welf

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The voting rule considered in this paper belongs to a large class of voting systems, called "range voting" or "utilitarian voting", where each voter rates each candidate with the help of a given evaluation scale and the winner is the candidate with the highest total score. In approval voting the evaluation scale only consists of two levels: 1 (approval) and 0 (non approval). However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge for evaluating the candidate. In this paper we propose a characterization of a rule (that we refer to as dis&approval voting) that allows for a third level in the evaluation scale. The three levels have the following interpretation: 1 means approval, 0 means indifference, abstention or 'do not know', and-1 means disapproval.

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“…There is a view that social choice should be performed using evaluations rather than rankings. In fact, the literature contains several examples of social choice procedures that use evaluations, including approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978), threshold aggregation involving three-graded rankings (Aleskerov et al 2007;Alcantud and Laruelle 2014), utilitarian voting (Hillinger 2005) and range voting (Gaertner and Xu 2012;Pivato 2014;Zahid and De Swart 2015;Macé 2018). A further example is majority judgment, introduced by Balinski and Laraki (2011), which selects the alternative with the highest median evaluation.…”

Section: Final Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

Kruger

Sanver

2021

Soc Choice Welf

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In a world where voters not only rank the alternatives but also qualify them as "approved" or "disapproved", we observe that majoritarianism in preferences and majoritarianism in approvals are logically incompatible. We show that this observation generalises to the following result: every aggregation rule that respects unanimity and decomposes the aggregation of preferences and approvals is dictatorial. Our result implies an incompatibility between ordinal and evaluative approaches to social choice theory under two weak assumptions: respect for unanimity and independence of evaluation of each alternative. We describe possibilities when the latter assumption is relaxed. On the other hand, our impossibility generalises to the case where there are more than the two evaluative levels of "approved" and "disapproved". JEL Classifications: D71.

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Threshold aggregation of the three-graded rankings

Cited by 6 publications

References 4 publications

Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting

Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting

Dis&approval voting: a characterization

An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

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