Three‐year‐olds' difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit

Abstract

The hypothesis, that a conceptual limitation underlies 3‐year‐olds' difficulty with false‐belief attribution (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), was tested against three competing hypotheses. These were: (1) failure to retain essential facts, (2) failure to understand the normal expectations which give rise to false belief and (3) pragmatic misinterpretation of the test question. Results showed that false‐belief attribution remained difficult for younger 3‐year‐olds despite their retention of essential facts and despite attempts to make expectations more explicit and prevent pragmatic misinterpretation. These findings strengthen the original hypothesis, specified here as the inability to assign conflicting truth values to propositions. This hypothesis can explain why 3‐year‐olds find pretend play, the distinction between expected and achieved outcomes, the real‐imaginary distinction and level 1 perspective taking easier to understand than false belief, the reality‐appearance distinction and level 2 perspective taking.

Are There Subgroups within the Autistic Spectrum? A Cluster Analysis of a Group of Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders

“…Theory of mind measures included the now famous '' SallyAnne '' task ( Baron-Cohen et al, 1985 ;Wimmer & Perner, 1983) ; and the '' Box of Smarties '' task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), as tests of '' first order '' theory of mind ; in this case as measures of false belief. Performance on these tasks indicates whether children have the ability to recognise that other people may have false beliefs about a situation, which can lead them to behave in a particular way.…”

Th.o.m.a.s.: An exploratory assessment of Theory of Mind in schizophrenic subjects

“…Smarties modified (cigarettes). This is a modified version (Pickup & Frith, 2001) of the original Smarties task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). The experimenter shows the subject a cigarette pack and asks: ''What is inside this?".…”

Neuropragmatics: Neuropsychological Constraints on Formal Theories of Dialogue

“…We used two classical tasks of the area, known under the names of ''Maxi task'' (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and ''Smarties task'' (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987 To pass these tasks, the subject has to realize the relationships between perception, belief, and action, and the autonomy of each individual's mental states. It is easy to see how closely the structure of these tasks resembles that of the other ones we devised.…”