Three Kinds of Social Kinds

Abstract

Could some social kinds be natural kinds? In this paper, I argue that there are three kinds of social kinds: 1) social kinds whose existence does not depend on human beings having any beliefs or other propositional attitudes towards them (e.g. recession, racism); 2) social kinds whose existence depends in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them, though attitudes need not be manifested towards their particular instances (e.g. money, war); 3) social kinds whose existence and that of their instances depend in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them (e.g. permanent resident, prime minister). Although all three kinds of social kinds are mind-dependent, this does not make them ontologically subjective or preclude them from being natural kinds. Rather, what prevents the third kind of social kinds from being natural kinds is that their properties are conventionally rather than causally linked.

The metaphysics of social kinds

“…22 See Hacking (1991aHacking ( , 1991bHacking ( , 1996Hacking ( , 2002Hacking ( , 2006; Hayek (1943); Ruben (1989); Searle (1995Searle ( , 2003Searle ( , 2007Searle ( , 2008Searle ( , 2010Searle ( , 2014; Thomasson (2003a and2003b); Tuomela (2007). By contrast, several of the essays collected in Haslanger (2012), as well as Khalidi (2013 and; Mallon (2003 and; Root (2000); and Sveinsdóttir (2013 and, defend the thesis that social kinds are mind-dependent, but not that they are therefore unreal. 23 For example, see Devitt (2005), Searle (1995) and Thomasson (2003).…”

“…ject to "looping effects," and Paul Griffiths (2004) argues that some social kinds are not natural kinds because they are normative categories. Khalidi (2013) argues that both concerns are spurious. For a related critique of Hacking, see Cooper (2004) and Mallon (2003 and.…”

“…6 See Mason, ms., for a more thoroughgoing defense of this line of argument.7 Other examples include genetically engineered species of plants and animals.8 It is a separate question whether social kinds figure in laws of nature qua social kinds, or whether all social scientific laws are reducible to physical laws.9 The claim that a kind is defined in terms of some properties should be understood on the model of real definition, which pertains to the nature of the kind itself, rather than a linguistic definition.10 We could have called a different set of microstructural properties (e.g., being XYZ) by the term "water," but we do not thereby determine the nature of the kind (i.e., being H 2 O) actually designated by that term. 11 See Bach (2012),Boyd (1999),Dupre (1993),Haslanger (2016),Griffiths (1999),Khalidi (2013),Kitcher (1984), Kornblith (1993, LaPorte (2004), and Millikan(2000).MASON…”

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

“…I contrast "social" with "natural" kinds solely on etiology (if these categories emerge in ordinary social contexts) and practical relevance for social cognition. On the issue of the ontological objectivity of social kinds, the degree by which they are "socially constructed" via arbitrary human decision-making or if there are facts of the matter independent of human intention, I will have something to say in the next subsection over at Postulate 12 (for lively contemporary discussions on this matter, see [70,71]). …”

Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups

“… See Mason () for arguments that some social kinds are more natural than others. Khalidi (, ) argues that some social kinds are natural. Dupré () argues that social kinds share some commonalities with biological kinds. …”