2009
DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2009.10805156
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Three Competing Paradigms: Vertical and Horizontal Integration of Safety Culture Research

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
(50 reference statements)
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“…Studies single out the importance of such features as training, extensive communication on the importance of safety, low thresholds for reporting incidents, flexible employees who are able to learn, and protections for whistle-blowers in creating a safety culture (e.g., see Flin et al, 2000;Reason, 1998Reason, , 2000Silbey, 2009). However, this work has been criticized for its inability to demonstrate causal relationships between such features and safety performance, a lack of conceptual clarity as to what, exactly, constitutes a safety culture, and a neglect of inequalities in power and authority and competing sets of legitimate interests in organizations (Clarke, 2000;Kim & Wang, 2009;Silbey, 2009). Another example of work that directly or indirectly attends to the notion of a risk culture are studies of 'high-reliability' organizations (HROs) such as aircraft carriers, chemical plants, health care teams and nuclear energy plants (e.g., Bierly & Spender, 1995;Bigley & Roberts, 2001;Klein et al, 1995).…”
Section: Organizing Risk Through Risk Culturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies single out the importance of such features as training, extensive communication on the importance of safety, low thresholds for reporting incidents, flexible employees who are able to learn, and protections for whistle-blowers in creating a safety culture (e.g., see Flin et al, 2000;Reason, 1998Reason, , 2000Silbey, 2009). However, this work has been criticized for its inability to demonstrate causal relationships between such features and safety performance, a lack of conceptual clarity as to what, exactly, constitutes a safety culture, and a neglect of inequalities in power and authority and competing sets of legitimate interests in organizations (Clarke, 2000;Kim & Wang, 2009;Silbey, 2009). Another example of work that directly or indirectly attends to the notion of a risk culture are studies of 'high-reliability' organizations (HROs) such as aircraft carriers, chemical plants, health care teams and nuclear energy plants (e.g., Bierly & Spender, 1995;Bigley & Roberts, 2001;Klein et al, 1995).…”
Section: Organizing Risk Through Risk Culturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The relation between fatalism and risk perception has not been widely examined (Marris, Langford, and O'Riordan 1998). However, studies found that higher perceived risk may be associated with fatalistic thinking (Salazar and Walsh 2006;Kim and Wang 2009).…”
Section: Fatalismmentioning
confidence: 99%