Threat assessment and management in higher education in the United States: A review of the 10 years since the mass casualty incident at Virginia Tech.

Abstract

The April 16, 2007 mass casualty incident at Virginia Tech had an immediate, significant, and enduring impact on approaches to campus safety in the United States. In the aftermath of the incident, there were numerous campus safety reviews, not only at Virginia Tech, but across the Commonwealth of Virginia, across the nation, and around the world. Those reviews by campus administrations, state and federal government agencies, professional associations, victim advocacy groups, and law enforcement bodies, resulted in hundreds of campus safety recommendations. Many of those recommendations were intended to improve reactive aspects of physical security, emergency preparedness, law enforcement response, and emergency notification. However, several recommendations addressed preventative approaches to enhance campus safety and bolster institutions' capabilities to identify, investigate, assess and manage actual and potential threats of violence to the campus community. This article will summarize the changes in approaches to behavioral threat assessment and management among institutions of higher education in the United States, drawing on the lessons confirmed and learned from the Virginia Tech incident and those that followed through various research efforts.

Documenting a Crisis: How Postsecondary Institutions Addressed DACA Students after Trump's Rescission

“…The first group of statements comprises those that followed crisis communications best practices by addressing those most affected by the crisis (Lawson, 2007), supporting underrepresented populations (Ulmer et al, 2015), and urging stakeholders to act in ways that promote self-aid and self-protection (Sellnow et al, 2015) by providing resources for the affected populations (Deisinger & Scalora, 2016). The second group of statements-representing 46.3% of the sample-condemned President Trump's actions without addressing DACA students or offering resources for these students.…”

“…Perhaps a watershed moment for critical examinations of crisis management in higher education, the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting-although categorized in this study as an emergency, not a crisis-produced a number of scholarly works that analyzed crisis management and institutional preparedness (Catullo, 2008;Deisinger & Scalora, 2016;Wang & Hutchins, 2010), touching upon Tierney's (1988) idea of reactive administrative responses before proactive administrative planning. Catullo (2008) found that important student affairs professionals believed their campuses to be prepared for a crisis in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, yet research focused on the Virginia Tech incident "made it abundantly clear that there are many complicated facets of crisis preparation on residential university campuses that professionals may not be prepared to handle and the need to be proactive has never been greater" (p. vi).…”

“…Borland defined internal stakeholders as including "employees, auxiliary leaders, campus ministry, students, and trustees who all have great responsibility, power, and influence in times of campus crises," whereas external stakeholders were defined as a "network of experts and community members that provide services and support in the campus' geopolitical and socio-economic home" (2017, p. 190). In a later perspective on the Virginia Tech massacre, Deisinger and Scalora (2016) asserted that Virginia Tech's cooperation with community-based resources ultimately led the U.S Department of Justice Office's to recommend "implementation of community-based approaches (in addition to campus based) to support effective prevention and intervention efforts" in crisis situations (p. 193). Here, although early studies had found Virginia Tech's institutional resources to be inadequate (Wang & Hutchins, 2010), the university's crisis communication with and coordination of community-based resources was recognized by the U.S. Department of Justice as a pillar of best practice in crisis management and communications.…”

“…Furthermore, the author asserted that the "speed of the Internet, and its content-rich channels, means that corporations need to be ready to provide more and more information, in multiple media and formats" (p. 175), speaking to the notion that institutions of higher education must differentiate their crisis communication across multiple platforms to ensure all stakeholders are appropriately addressed (Connolly, 2013;Romero, 2013). Bridgeman's assertions ultimately foreshadowed Deisinger and Scalora's (2016) findings that organizations must partner with external stakeholders, thus "reaching out to and asking for directions from a community of stakeholders, who, in the midst of a crisis, are empowered by the web to help a company get back on track" (p. 177). Here, it is important for organizations of all types to engage with external stakeholders to maximize the impact of the Internet, especially as it can be used to disseminate crisis communications.…”

The Swedish School Attack in Trollhättan

“…Although this paradox is troubling, it should not prevent the establishment of such threat assessment teams in communities, educational settings, and corporate settings, because they work . In a few states in the United States, such threat assessment teams are required by law, particularly in educational settings, and were prompted by massacres such as the one at Virginia Tech in 2007 and Sandy Hook in 2012 . Threat assessment teams are also being established throughout Europe with the formation of multidisciplinary efforts in both universities and corporate settings.…”