This is social science: A ‘patterned activity’ oriented to attaining objective knowledge of human society

Abstract

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that approaching social science as a ‘patterned activity’ draws attention both to the distinctive nature of social science and to its central subject matter – meaningful (symbolically oriented) behavior and theoretical entities based on it – enabling therefore a constructive perspective on the major debate regarding social science’s organizing principles. A patterned activity is defined as a cluster of behavior oriented to a basic (that is, characteristic or defining) goal or aim accorded value; the goal or aim, by which the norms of the patterned activity are bounded, is the satisfaction of a certain appetite, desire, or need. The concept of a patterned activity is rooted in and developed from elements of Max Weber’s methodological writings. This concept is evaluated against Clifford Geertz’s ‘cultural systems’ approach and Robert K. Merton’s view of the norms of science, and the article then addresses the legacy of Talcott Parsons more generally. Lastly, Émile Durkheim’s and Weber’s respective approaches to social science are assessed so as to illuminate their views regarding its central subject matter and to demonstrate a convergence of their views.

On the Centrality of Action: Social Science, Historical Logics, and Max Weber's Legacy

“…This is noteworthy because Weber bequeathed to social science a view on the nature of the social which not only anticipates as it were Sewell's view but surpasses it insofar as it also offers a theory of motivational understanding that ties symbolically constituted behavior to the putative states of consciousness of individual actors (Greenfeld, : 325; Greenfeld and Malczewski, ; Malczewski, ; cf. Campbell, : 209–212).…”

“…William H. Sewell, Jr.'s question, “What do we mean by the ‘social’ in social science?” (2005f: 318), signals to social scientists of all stripes that the definition of the central subject matter of social science endures as a signal problem and source of contention (cf. Alexander and Seidman, ; Friedman, ; Greenfeld, , , , and ; Joyce, ; Latour, ; Malczewski, ; Pascale, : 160–161; Small, ; Spillman, : 5–7). The definition of the central subject matter of social science is of fundamental concern, for embedded in this definition is a view as to what constitutes the putative organizing principle upon which the empirical validity of social scientific claims may be judged as well as a view as to what provides the empirical link that binds the various social sciences together and that permits their comparability and intelligibility.…”

“…By their very nature, descriptive claims about empirical phenomena must factor in and index the characteristics of such phenomena in order to be scientifically valid. Complementarity is essential (Malczewski, ). This much is obvious.…”

“…find its complement in ) evidence through systematic testing. In the absence of a defined set of comparable empirical phenomena, social science constitutes an indefinite activity, one – although it may share an aim (Malczewski, ) – without a true shared object and without standards permitting rigorous and consistent adjudication amongst theories.…”

“…This is not to suggest that such objectively observable characteristics are patent, uncontested, or even interesting. The most basic descriptive claim or concept depends in an important way upon the qualities taken to be of significance by the person constructing the claim, and thus it depends in a certain important respect upon the question or problem driving the investigation (Malczewski, ). The resulting claim, however, must refer explicitly to characteristics that are objectively observable and subject to corroboration by others.…”