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Corkum, Phil

doi:10.3366/anph.2019.0004

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Some scholars take this to imply that they are both individuals (see, e.g., Frede-Patzig 1988 II, 52), while others have argued that a 'this something' can be determinate without being an individual (see, e.g., Gill 1989, 31-4). We do not have to enter this debate (for more, see Corkum 2019). But minimally, if being an individual is one way of being determinate, Aristotle claims that composites and forms are determinate entities, unlike matter which is 'indeterminate' (ἀόριστον) (see, e.g., Z.11, 1037a27), and only potentially a 'this something' (H.1, 1042a27-8).…”

Section: The Contours Of Metaphysics Zhmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z as First Philosophy

Meister

2022

Phronesis

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Discussions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z tend to treat it either as an independent treatise on substance and essence or as preliminary to the main conclusions of the Metaphysics. I argue instead that Z is central to Aristotle’s project of first philosophy in the Metaphysics: the first philosopher seeks the first causes of being qua being, especially substances, and in Z Aristotle establishes that essences or forms are the first causes of being of perceptible substances. I also argue that the centrality of Z to first philosophy is compatible with its status as theology.

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Section: The Contours Of Metaphysics Zhmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z as First Philosophy

Meister

2022

Phronesis

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The Becoming of Identity: A Process-Ontological View on the Relational Co-existence of Biological Beings

Röck

2024

Biosemiotics

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Natural Inseparability in Aristotle,MetaphysicsE.1, 1026a14

Griffin

2022

Apeiron

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At Aristotle, Metaphysics E.1, 1026a14, Schwegler’s conjectural emendation of the manuscript reading ἀχώριστα to χωριστά has been widely adopted. The objects of physical science are therefore here ‘separate’, or ‘independently existent’. By contrast, the manuscripts make them ‘not separate’, construed by earlier commentators as dependent on matter. In this paper, I offer a new defense of the manuscript reading. I review past defenses based on the internal consistency of the chapter, explore where they have left supporters of the emendation unpersuaded, and attempt to strengthen their appeal. I challenge Schwegler’s central case, developed by Ross and others, that the construction μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐκ demands an implausible ‘logical antithesis’ between inseparability and mobility. This is arguably the fundamental obstacle to the manuscript reading, and counterexamples have not to date convinced emenders. I offer a new, systematic review of Aristotle’s use of the phrase, including relevant cases from the Rhetoric, to show how its usual meaning in Aristotle supports the transmitted text; I also reply to possible objections. Finally, I explore the implications of this defense for the classification of the sciences in E.1.

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This

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z as First Philosophy

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z as First Philosophy

The Becoming of Identity: A Process-Ontological View on the Relational Co-existence of Biological Beings

Natural Inseparability in Aristotle,MetaphysicsE.1, 1026a14

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