Thinking without Words

Bermúdez, José Luis

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159691.001.0001

Cited by 317 publications

(107 citation statements)

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“…Furthermore, the term ''language'' is also misleading, because there is (as far as we know) no semantics or grammar in the ritualized movements of the dance. ''Indexical'' or ''iconic'' (Bermudez, 2003) would be better descriptive terms to characterize the informational status of the dance.…”

Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition in Invertebrates

Menzel

Brembs

Giurfa

2007

Evolution of Nervous Systems

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Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition in Invertebrates

Menzel

Brembs

Giurfa

2007

Evolution of Nervous Systems

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“…Only by forming a conception of what it is for something to be a G that is no longer tied to the objects in the second domain. That is to say, only by forming a conception of what it is for an arbitrary object to be a G. And it is this that the introduction of the relative pronoun makes possible (Bermudez 2003). The relative clause allows complex predicates to be extracted from complete thought in a form that will allow them to be applied to objects falling under other cognitive domains, and the defining feature of domain-general cognition is that objects from one domain can be thought about in terms formerly associated only with objects from another domain, as in totemic art when an artifact is attributed the properties of an animal, or as in advanced tool construction when the design of a tool is specifically tailored to properties of the intended prey.…”

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confidence: 99%

The cognitive functions of language

2002

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This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is de facto the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include the view that language is necessary for the acquisition of many human concepts and the view that language can serve to scaffold human thought processes. The paper also discusses the thesis that language may be the medium of conscious propositional thinking, but argues that this cannot be its most fundamental cognitive role. The idea is then proposed that natural language is the medium for nondomain-specific thinking, serving to integrate the outputs of a variety of domain-specific conceptual faculties (or central-cognitive "quasimodules"). Recent experimental evidence in support of this idea is reviewed and the implications of the idea are discussed, especially for our conception of the architecture of human cognition. Finally, some further kinds of evidence which might serve to corroborate or refute the hypothesis are mentioned. The overall goal of the paper is to review a wide variety of accounts of the cognitive function of natural language, integrating a number of different kinds of evidence and theoretical consideration in order to propose and elaborate the most plausible candidate.Keywords: Cognitive evolution; conceptual module; consciousness; domain-general; inner speech; language; logical form (LF); thought Peter Carruthers is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Maryland, College Park. Until recently he Directed the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies at the University of Sheffield. He is the author of eight books, coeditor of four, and has published numerous articles in journals and collections. There are two major foci to his main research area in philosophy of psychology. One is the nature of consciousness, where he has developed and defended a form of higher-order thought theory. The other is the architecture of human cognition, and the place of natural language within it.that language is only a channel, or conduit, for transferring thoughts into and out of the mind, they are then obliged to claim that the stream of inner verbalization is more-or-less epiphenomenal in character. (Some possible minor cognitive roles for inner speech, which should nevertheless be acceptable to those adopting this perspective, will be canvassed later.) The real thinking will be going on elsewhere, in some other medium of representation.One reason for the popularity of the communicative conception amongst cognitive scientists is that almost all now believe that language is a distinct input-output module of the mind (at least in some ...

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“…One might hold a traditional view of believing as using a mental representation in a particular way, and debate whether representations require language or concepts (e.g. Davidson 1975;Stich 1979) or not (e.g., Bermudez 2003); alternatively, one might give a dispositional theory of belief (e.g., Schwitzgebel 2012). Either way, the debate presupposes that the human case is the norm; the only issue is whether we have sufficient evidence that other animals can justifiably be said to satisfy an account of belief modeled on the human case.…”

Section: ) But Do Neurons Prefermentioning

confidence: 99%

On the proper domain of psychological predicates

Figdor

2014

Synthese

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One question of the bounds of cognition is that of which things have it. A scientifically relevant debate on this question must explain the persistent and selective use of psychological predicates to report findings throughout biology: for example, that neurons prefer, plants and fruit flies decide, and bacteria communicate linguistically. This paper argues that these claims should enjoy default literal interpretation, and that these reports of psychological properties in non-humans are as straightforward as they seem. An epistemic consequence is that these findings can contribute directly to understanding the nature of psychological capacities.

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Thinking without Words

Cited by 317 publications

References 0 publications

Cognition in Invertebrates

Cognition in Invertebrates

The cognitive functions of language

On the proper domain of psychological predicates

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