Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice

Shafir, Eldar; Tversky, Amos

doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90015-t

Cited by 548 publications

(452 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…First, the overall level of disjunction effect was much lower than that observed by Shafir and Tversky (1992). However, our results are consistent with other recent similar research (Matthew & Busemeyer, 2010; see also Croson, 1999, for a demonstration of a weaker disjunction effect with an 'imagining' procedure similar to the one we adopted).…”

Section: -------------------------Table 1----------------------------supporting

confidence: 92%

“…Second, we did not observe a disjunction effect in the way Shafir and Tversky (1992) did. We found that, when the optimal strategy was D, in the standard Prisoner's Dilemma game, Pr(D|Known D)>Pr(D|Known C), Pr(D| Unknown).…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 59%

“…This is a fundamental principle of classical probability theory. But, participants' behavior in Shafir and Tversky's (1992) experiment is inconsistent with the sure thing principle and so with classical probability theory (this is sometimes called the disjunction effect). Why is this significant?…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Pothos¹,

Perry²,

Corr³

et al. 2011

Personality and Individual Differences

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. In the standard one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner's Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models. Permanent repository link

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Section: -------------------------Table 1----------------------------supporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 59%

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Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Pothos¹,

Perry²,

Corr³

et al. 2011

Personality and Individual Differences

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“…Table 4 shows that 61% (48/79) of B signals led to [A,A] outcomes, compared to the 55% (197/360) probability of an [A,A] outcome in the NS treatment. This result may be analogous to the nonconsequentalist reasoning discussed by Shafir and Tversky (1992) and Croson (1999), where (in a prisoner's dilemma) a player is more likely to cooperate when he does not know the action of the other player than when he knows the other player has chosen the cooperative move. 24 Note that B signals were made only 81% of the time in their Aumann's conjecture test; moreover, in a third Clark et al game where players have a clear incentive to report truthfully, the chance of a B signal is only 51.5% and the likelihood of B play is only about 29.5% (this figure provided by Martin Sefton).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 63%

Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture

Charness

2000

Games and Economic Behavior

227

166

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The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, "an agreement to play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what the players will do" and thus should not affect behavior. Farrell and Rabin suspect that cheap talk will achieve efficiency. Results show impressive coordination when the sender first chooses a signal and then an action. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency are largely unsuccessful. As Farrell suggests, reversing the order of the action and signal appears to change players' behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A13, C72, C91, D82, D84.

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“…One phenomenon is called nonconsequentalist reasoning and demonstrates a violation of the Savage (1954) sure-thing principle, as people "often do not consider appropriately each of the relevant branches of a decision tree." 11 Timing of decisions may also have an effect: Newcomb's problem (Nozick, 1969) shows the delicate 10 See Shafir and Tversky, 1992, and Croson, 1997. Note that payoffs in these experiments reflected choices actually made by subjects.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

2000

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Abstract:In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our "hot" treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our "cold" treatment we follow the "strategy method" and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.2

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Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice

Cited by 548 publications

References 32 publications

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

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