Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play

Croson, Rachel

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00078-5

Cited by 195 publications

(150 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…2 Such experiments include expectations for prices (Fisher, 1962;Schmalensee, 1976), expectations about artificially constructed time series (Hey, 1994), expectations in normal-form games (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2001), about the provision of public-goods (Offerman et al, 1996;Croson, 2000), expectations in the cobweb economy (Hommes et al, 2007), on monetary policies (e.g. Marimon and Sunder, 1993;Bernasconi and Kirchkamp, 2000) or even fiscal policy (Swenson, 1997).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data

Bernasconi

Kirchkamp

Paruolo

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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a b s t r a c tWe generate observable expectations about fiscal variables through laboratory experiments using real world data from several European countries as stimuli. We compare a VAR model of expectations for data that is presented in a fiscal frame with one for neutrally presented data. We test the validity of the setup and find that participants understand the meaning of the fiscal variables, but also that their ability to perceive the correct characteristics of fiscal policy is limited. Expectations are consistent neither with rational nor with purely adaptive expectations, but instead follow an augmented-adaptive scheme.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data

Bernasconi

Kirchkamp

Paruolo

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Since the baseline sequences uniformly preceded the forecasting sequences, the comparatively lower initial collusive efficiencies in the baseline sequences may quite possibly be attributable to learning effects. In any case, the forecasting treatment clearly does nothing to dampen prices in this design, as results by Croson (2000) would suggest. This is a second result.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 78%

Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies

2009

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Abstract:We study the effects of price signaling activity and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in posted offer markets. The primary experiment consists of a baseline sequence that is an extensively repeated variant of a standard posted offer market, and a 'forecast' sequence that adds to the baseline sequence a forecasting game that allows a refined identification of signaling activity. We find that 'forecast' signals differ from standard 'market' signals, and that while both raise market collusiveness, they do so only temporarily. On the other hand, seller propensities to cooperate do affect long-term outcomes. A secondary experiment demonstrates that seller 'type' determines collusiveness.

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“…This is because expectations about approval/disapproval are somehow based on expectations about choices. Now, some evidence suggests that players change their behavior if they become more aware about the co-player's expected choice (see Croson, 2000). This could affect our estimation of the awareness factor, but it seems impossible at the present to separate both phenomena.…”

Section: Evidence On Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Finally, one can prove that there may exist several equilibria if α C (δ) > α D (δ) for some but not for all δ. 5 Suppose now that players can provide feedback in the PD. Should that foster cooperation?…”

Section: Disapproval-aversion: a Toy Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments

López-Pérez

Vorsatz

2010

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co-players have the opportunity to approve/disapprove a player's choice, even if that has no consequences on the player's material payoff. Using a prisoner's dilemma, we experimentally study the causes of this phenomenon, which seems crucial to understand compliance with social norms.Our data is consistent with a model based on the assumption that people feel badly if they expect to be disapproved by others. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in line with the following assumptions: (i) People become more aware about the others opinion if feedback is available, and (ii) even if the feedback is ex post and has no effect on their ex ante expectations about disapproval, people prefer not to receive negative feedback.

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Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play

Cited by 195 publications

References 20 publications

Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data

Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data

Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies

On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments

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