Things mere mortals can do, but philosophers can't

Freedom, self-prediction, and the possibility of time travel

“…Stephanie Rennick (2015) argues for a similar conclusion. There are intentions that sufficiently reflective time travellers cannot form.…”

“…Even if practical deliberation has other important benefits, such as helping us make good decisions, and even if reasons play an essential role in deliberation, the centrality of its doxastic and epistemic functions provide good reason to think that an ignorance condition must be satisfied for reasonable deliberation. Ignorance conditions against self-prediction have been defended as conditions on forming intentions (Harman 1976;Rennick 2015), forming decisions (Ginet 1962), recognising an option as available in deliberation (Levi 1986, Ch. 4;Kapitan 1986), being 'epistemically free' in deliberation (Fernandes 2016a), and on deliberating practically (Hampshire and Hart 1958;Dennett 1984, p. 113).…”

“…There is no straightforward inference from limits on intention to limits on action. This is why Rennick's (2015) conclusion in a similar case is limited to Tim's ability to murder young-gramps: murder, unlike most actions, explicitly requires intention.…”

Time travel and counterfactual asymmetry

“…3 Vihvelin (1996) rejects the first reading for cases in which, she argues, the counterfactual antecedent can't be brought about except by failure of the attempt (without introducing large miracles). Rennick (2015) rejects the first reading for cases in which the time traveller intentionally tries to bring about what they…”

“… Ismael (2003, p. 314) andArntzenius (2006, p. 613) also note that violations of evidential asymmetry in time travel cases may spell trouble for asymmetric counterfactual and causal reasoning. But neither takes this to affect the time traveller's abilities Rennick (2015). argues that a time traveller's freedom may be limited by her beliefs.…”