Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets

Akbarpour, Mohammad; Li, Shengwu; Gharan, Shayan Oveis

doi:10.1086/704761

Cited by 127 publications

(128 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…15 While our description above applies in many situations, there are several exceptions and limitations. For instance, for organ transplants appointments are made using a dynamic matching procedure that weights waiting for more available organs in order to create a larger compatibility pool against greedily matching and assigning the next-available appointment (Akbarpour et al, 2016). Emergency room rules for dealing with life threatening situations are also different.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices

Klaus

Nichifor

2019

Econ Theory

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We propose a new set of mechanisms, which we call serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for the allocation of one indivisible good. We show that a mechanism ϕ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering such that ϕ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and . We obtain a second characterization by replacing individual rationality with non-imposition. In both our characterizations r, , and ϕ are all found simultaneously and endogenously from the properties. In addition, we show that in our model a mechanism satisfies Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and consistency if and only if it is welfare equivalent to a classical serial dictatorship. Finally, we illustrate how the normative requirements governing the functioning of some real life markets and the mechanisms that these markets use are reasonably well captured by our model and results.JEL classification: C78, D47, D71

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices

Klaus

Nichifor

2019

Econ Theory

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“…A complementary class dynamic matching model examine one‐time matchings that arise over multiple periods. Here, focus has ranged from questions of preference formation (Kadam, ) and unraveling (Roth and Xing, ) to managing the (stochastic) arrival and departure of agents or objects (Ünver, ; Baccara et al., ; Thakral, ; Akbarpour et al., ; Leshno, ). Doval () examines an economy of this latter type and independently proposes a definition of “dynamic stability,” which is distinct from our proposal.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Multiperiod Matching

Kadam

Kotowski

2018

Int Economic Review

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We examine a dynamic, two‐sided, one‐to‐one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.

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“…5 More precisely, Akbarpour et al (2017), in the spirit of an organ exchange application such as the 'kidney exchange', identify the optimal mechanism to maximize the number of matches, that is, to minimize the number of agents perishing resulting from failing to get recipients matched with donors in time. In the model of Akbarpour et al (2017), agents from both sides of the market arrive and leave stochastically and all carry identical match values, i.e., they are of the same type (in the spirit of each life being worth the same). However, there are two types of agents, as some matches are feasible and others are infeasible, thus rendering some agents easier -others harder -to match.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are two types of agents, as some matches are feasible and others are infeasible, thus rendering some agents easier -others harder -to match. 6 The optimal mechanism identified by Akbarpour et al (2017) minimizes the number of unmatched patients based on information concerning arrivals and departures, which may involve delaying compatible matches. Without such information, greedy scheduling is always optimal in this setting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quick or Cheap? Breaking Points in Dynamic Markets

2019

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We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to form efficient pairs in order to reduce matching costs. We show that such markets are characterized by a quick or cheap dilemma: Under a large class of distributional assumptions, there is no 'free lunch', i.e., there exists no clearing schedule that is simultaneously optimal along both objectives. We further identify a unique breaking point signifying a stark reduction in matching cost contrasted by an increase in waiting time. Generalizing this model, we identify two regimes: one, where no free lunch exists; the other, where a window of opportunity opens to achieve a free lunch. Remarkably, greedy scheduling is never optimal in this setting.

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Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets

Cited by 127 publications

References 13 publications

Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices

Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices

Multiperiod Matching

Quick or Cheap? Breaking Points in Dynamic Markets

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