Theτ-value for games on matroids

Bilbao, Jesús Mario; Jiménez-Losada, Andrés; Lebrón, E.; Tijs, S.H.

doi:10.1007/bf02578941

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A Cooperative Distribution Game1

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2010

2022

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Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…[26]); in the τ-value literature especially, it is called the minimal right vector (e.g. [17], [27]). …”

Section: A Cooperative Distribution Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness: A Challenge for the Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Value Chains

Zelewski¹,

Jene²

2011

IJMVSC

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“…[26]); in the τ-value literature especially, it is called the minimal right vector (e.g. [17], [27]). …”

Section: A Cooperative Distribution Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness: A Challenge for the Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Value Chains

Zelewski¹,

Jene²

2011

IJMVSC

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“…The lower bound LB for the distribution of the efficiency gain G is that point in the solution space R ³0 N , in which the minimum allocable share v n.min of the efficiency gain G is assigned to each actor A n with n = 1,...,N. The lower bound LB is often called the threat point (Kuhn et al, 1996); in the τ-value literature especially, it is called minimal right vector (Bilbao et al, 2002;Tijs, 1981).…”

Section: -( )mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Distribution of Efficiency Gains in Supply Networks from a Cooperative Game Theory Point of View

Zelewski

Peters

2010

International Journal of Information Systems and Supply Chain Management

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In this paper, the authors address the distribution of efficiency gains among partially autonomous supply network actors in a manner they will accept as fair and as an incentive to cooperation. The problem is economically significant because it requires substantiating efficiency gains in an understandable manner. Moreover, supply networks suffer from a conflict potential because the partially autonomous actors seek to maximize their own shares of the efficiency gain. The method applied appropriates a model from cooperative game theory involving the t-value. The special nature of the t-value ensures that it seems rational to the actors to cooperate in the supply network. The proposed method for the distribution problem offers a fair distribution of efficiency gains in the supply network and ensures that the distribution results can be communicated easily.

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Fair Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Supply Chains: A Justification Program from an Economic Point of View

Zelewski

2017

Contributions to Management Science

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Theτ-value for games on matroids

Abstract: τ-value, matroid, cooperative game, 91A12,

Cited by 6 publications

References 6 publications

Fairness: A Challenge for the Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Value Chains

Fairness: A Challenge for the Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Value Chains

Fair Distribution of Efficiency Gains in Supply Networks from a Cooperative Game Theory Point of View

Fair Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Supply Chains: A Justification Program from an Economic Point of View

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