2020
DOI: 10.1093/idpl/ipz026
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They who must not be identified—distinguishing personal from non-personal data under the GDPR

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Cited by 97 publications
(70 citation statements)
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“…The difficulty in holding personal data separate from de-identified data may have been because the distinction was not clear in the mind of participants and the short videos shown to participants may have been insufficient to facilitate deeper understandings. However, it also reflects ongoing academic, regulatory and technical debate about the conceptual boundaries of personal and non-personal data, as well as methods of identification, de-identification and re-identification, and the persistent confusion between these terms [44][45][46].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The difficulty in holding personal data separate from de-identified data may have been because the distinction was not clear in the mind of participants and the short videos shown to participants may have been insufficient to facilitate deeper understandings. However, it also reflects ongoing academic, regulatory and technical debate about the conceptual boundaries of personal and non-personal data, as well as methods of identification, de-identification and re-identification, and the persistent confusion between these terms [44][45][46].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first is an absolute approach, where anonymized data constitute personal data if there is even a theoretical chance of reidentification. This approach represents the state of national law in a minority of EU member states, such as France [ 51 ]. The second is the relative approach, where anonymized data are no longer personal data if it is reasonably likely that methods do not exist to reidentify individuals [ 50 ].…”
Section: Regulatory Hurdles For the Use Of Encryption Technologiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it also reflects ongoing academic, regulatory and technical debate about the conceptual boundaries of personal and non-personal data, as well as methods of identification, de-identification and reidentification. 41 Participants did not expect a guarantee of anonymity or data security and they were willing to accept some risks in order to gain the potential benefits of PM. Participants were most motived to accept these inherent risks for research aimed at producing public benefit.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%