Abstract:Populist attributions of blame have important effects on citizens’ attitudes, cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Extending previous studies that have mostly looked at populist messages blaming political elites, we use an online survey experiment (N = 805) to investigate the effects of blaming different elitist actors in populist and non-populist ways: (1) political elites, (2) corporate elites, (3) scientific elites, and (4) a combination of these elites. We compare mere causal responsibility attribution to … Show more
“…While politicians' criticism of science or media is nothing new (Oreskes & Conway, 2011;Watts et al, 1999), social media enable the dissemination of attacks that otherwise would not have passed through journalistic gatekeeping. Especially populist politicians frequently use social media to spread anti-media and anti-science criticism and highlight their opposition to elite institutions (Egelhofer et al, 2021;Engesser et al, 2017;Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021).…”
Section: Politicians' Attacks Against Journalists and Scientists On S...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Today, one central theme of politicians' anti-media and anti-science communication is accusing these sources of spreading disinformation, "fake news," or "fake science." In doing so, these media and science are portrayed as malicious groups that intentionally lie and pursue hidden interests (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019;Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021). The threat of (scientific) mis-and disinformation is a prominent theme in public discourse (Scheufele & Krause, 2019), leaving citizens highly concerned about being deceived by available information (Newman et al, 2019).…”
Section: Politicians' Attacks Against Journalists and Scientists On S...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is important to note that this sample size might be suboptimal for analyzing interaction effects which are said to require up to 16 times bigger sample sizes. Therefore, we will interpret these effects with caution (see also Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021)…”
Section: Samplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Political actors regularly attack media and science when it contradicts their political agenda (Druckman, 2017;Krämer & Klingler, 2020;Smith, 2010), frequently portraying them as a source of "fake news" and disinformation. This disinformation discourse is particularly popular among populist politicians, who argue that scientists and journalists are part of an "evil elite," deliberately misleading the public (Egelhofer et al, 2021;Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019;Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021;Mede & Schäfer, 2020). In the context of decreasing trust in science and journalism and growing online hostility towards experts, this type of discourse is highly concerning and has been characterized as "one of the most important challenges to science communication today" (Krämer & Klingler, 2020, p. 254).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If these verbal attacks impede effective science communication on pressing challenges such as climate change or pandemics, it can have severe consequences for humanity (e.g., Druckman, 2017). However, thus far, there is minimal evidence of the effects of politicians' attacks on science and journalism (but see Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021). Against this backdrop, this pre-registered survey experiment (N = 548) explores how politicians' attacks affect citizens' perceptions of scientists and journalists, the information they provide, and the perceptions of the politicians using these accusations.…”
In today’s “post-truth” world, concerns over political attacks on the legitimacy of expert knowledge and scientific facts are growing. Especially populist politicians frequently use their social media platforms to target science and journalism, arguing these are part of an “evil elite,” deliberately misleading the public by spreading disinformation. While this type of discourse is highly concerning, thus far, we lack empirical evidence on how these accusations affect the public perceptions of scientists and journalists. To fill this gap, this study tests how politicians’ attacks affect citizens’ trust in journalists and scientists and the information provided by them. Furthermore, it investigates whether this discourse renders hostility towards journalists and scientists acceptable and whether there are effects on the image of politicians using such anti-science rhetoric. Findings suggest that the effects of politicians’ attacks on citizens’ perceptions of scientists and journalists are limited. Only individuals with strong anti-elitist attitudes are susceptible to disinformation accusations and indicate less belief in discredited scientific information. Interestingly, these individuals also perceive politicians using such attacks as more trustworthy and authentic.
“…While politicians' criticism of science or media is nothing new (Oreskes & Conway, 2011;Watts et al, 1999), social media enable the dissemination of attacks that otherwise would not have passed through journalistic gatekeeping. Especially populist politicians frequently use social media to spread anti-media and anti-science criticism and highlight their opposition to elite institutions (Egelhofer et al, 2021;Engesser et al, 2017;Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021).…”
Section: Politicians' Attacks Against Journalists and Scientists On S...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Today, one central theme of politicians' anti-media and anti-science communication is accusing these sources of spreading disinformation, "fake news," or "fake science." In doing so, these media and science are portrayed as malicious groups that intentionally lie and pursue hidden interests (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019;Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021). The threat of (scientific) mis-and disinformation is a prominent theme in public discourse (Scheufele & Krause, 2019), leaving citizens highly concerned about being deceived by available information (Newman et al, 2019).…”
Section: Politicians' Attacks Against Journalists and Scientists On S...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is important to note that this sample size might be suboptimal for analyzing interaction effects which are said to require up to 16 times bigger sample sizes. Therefore, we will interpret these effects with caution (see also Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021)…”
Section: Samplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Political actors regularly attack media and science when it contradicts their political agenda (Druckman, 2017;Krämer & Klingler, 2020;Smith, 2010), frequently portraying them as a source of "fake news" and disinformation. This disinformation discourse is particularly popular among populist politicians, who argue that scientists and journalists are part of an "evil elite," deliberately misleading the public (Egelhofer et al, 2021;Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019;Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021;Mede & Schäfer, 2020). In the context of decreasing trust in science and journalism and growing online hostility towards experts, this type of discourse is highly concerning and has been characterized as "one of the most important challenges to science communication today" (Krämer & Klingler, 2020, p. 254).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If these verbal attacks impede effective science communication on pressing challenges such as climate change or pandemics, it can have severe consequences for humanity (e.g., Druckman, 2017). However, thus far, there is minimal evidence of the effects of politicians' attacks on science and journalism (but see Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021). Against this backdrop, this pre-registered survey experiment (N = 548) explores how politicians' attacks affect citizens' perceptions of scientists and journalists, the information they provide, and the perceptions of the politicians using these accusations.…”
In today’s “post-truth” world, concerns over political attacks on the legitimacy of expert knowledge and scientific facts are growing. Especially populist politicians frequently use their social media platforms to target science and journalism, arguing these are part of an “evil elite,” deliberately misleading the public by spreading disinformation. While this type of discourse is highly concerning, thus far, we lack empirical evidence on how these accusations affect the public perceptions of scientists and journalists. To fill this gap, this study tests how politicians’ attacks affect citizens’ trust in journalists and scientists and the information provided by them. Furthermore, it investigates whether this discourse renders hostility towards journalists and scientists acceptable and whether there are effects on the image of politicians using such anti-science rhetoric. Findings suggest that the effects of politicians’ attacks on citizens’ perceptions of scientists and journalists are limited. Only individuals with strong anti-elitist attitudes are susceptible to disinformation accusations and indicate less belief in discredited scientific information. Interestingly, these individuals also perceive politicians using such attacks as more trustworthy and authentic.
Increasing expression of antagonism toward immigrants has turned immigration into one of the most polarizing issues in many countries, among them Finland, dividing people into those who favor and those who oppose immigration. But while affective polarization of the kind exemplified by widespread responses to immigration has recently received increasing attention from political psychologists, little attention has been paid to how affective polarization develops through the mutual reinforcement of opposing discourses. The application of critical discursive psychology to interviews with lay Finns reveals this mutual reinforcement in progress. In our interviews, Finns across the political spectrum construct five subject positions by attributing blame for immigration‐related challenges. Both sides blame some “other” for the challenges while exempting themselves from blame. Our study makes three contributions to political psychology: exploring how blame attribution helps to generate affective polarization, illustrating the ability of (critical) discursive psychology to illuminate processes of affective polarization in individuals, and bringing the concept of affective polarization drawn from survey research into dialogue with the concept of subject positions constructed by blame attribution drawn from discursive studies of populism.
Why would a politician ever want to be blamed? Under what contextual conditions might blame-seeking behaviour emerge as a rational strategy? What tactics, tools and strategies might they deploy? Where is the empirical evidence of blame-seeking in action and why does it matter? These are the questions this article engages with as it challenges the long-standing ‘self-evident truth’ within political science that blame-is-bad. We argue that a new ‘blame game’ has emerged in which blame generation is deployed not solely to taint opponents but also to demonstrate the blame-seeker’s willingness to challenge convention, break the rules, or side with the marginalized. In a broader context characterized by democratic dissatisfaction, anti-political sentiment and affective polarization, we suggest that blame-seeking assumes a powerful symbolic and performative dimension. Antagonizing certain sections of society and then harnessing the backlash provides a powerful political strategy which challenges traditional scholarly assumptions about credit and blame existing in a zero-sum relationship. We illustrate these arguments using the case of Boris Johnson’s rise to the British premiership. A focus on blame-seeking, we suggest, expands our understanding of what politicians say and do to achieve their goals in polarized political contexts.
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