There might be nothing

Metaphysical nihilism and the subtraction argument

“…Thomas Baldwin (1996) and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) think so. They adhere, then, to the doctrine of nihilism, as Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra call it.…”

The Subtraction Argument(s)

“…Rodriguez‐Pereyra’s version of the argument, which refines that of Baldwin 1996, has the following premises (1997, 164):…”

“…The subtraction argument aims to establish that there is an empty world, in the sense of a possible world with no concrete objects. It was first put forward in the recent literature by Baldwin 1996 and refined in Rodriguez‐Pereyra 1997 1 . In Paseau 2002 I complained that the argument is invalid; Lowe 2002 also offers some objections to it.…”

There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved

“…Van Inwagen (1996), although he has not denied it, has argued that it is as improbable as anything may be. In a recent paper Thomas Baldwin (1996) presents and defends what he calls the subtraction argument , designed to establish the nihilist thesis. When defending the first premiss of his argument, Baldwin introduces failure to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles as the 'mark of concreteness'.…”