There is Something about the Image: A Defence of the Two-Component View of Imagination

Abstract

According to the two‐component view of sensory imagination, imaginative states combine qualitative and assigned content. Qualitative content is the imagistic component of the imaginative state and is provided by a quasi‐perceptual image; assigned content has a language‐like structure. Recently, such a two‐component view has been criticized by Daniel Hutto and Nicholas Wiltsher, both of whom have argued that postulating two contents is unnecessary for explaining how imagination represents. In this paper, I will defend the two‐component theory by arguing that it has three explanatory advantages over its competitors. First, it makes explicit a widely acknowledged distinction between engaged imagination and mere supposition. Second, it explains how imagination is constrained by objects’ perceptual appearances. Third, it explains how imaginings can be exploratory.

A Sensibilist Explanation of Imaginative Resistance

“…Weatherson actually distinguishes between four puzzles. The other two are not relevant in the present context.2 For further discussions about the differences between imagining and supposing, see, for instance,Tooming (2018) andWeinberg and Meskin (2006) and the references therein.…”

The Problem of Modally Bad Company

“…Thanks to an anonymous referee of another journal for pushing me to make the difference between labels and stipulations clearer.17 For a nice discussion of both their arguments and the additive view, seeTooming (2018).…”