There is no right to the death of the fetus

Hendricks, Perry

doi:10.1111/bioe.12455

Cited by 11 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Numerous philosophers have argued that Räsänen is unsuccessful in establishing a right to the death of the fetus whether AWT is viable or not. [6][7][8][9] Importantly, Thomson herself argues that there is no right to the death of the fetus. Mary Anne Warren makes a similar point: if a pregnancy could be ended without killing the fetus then there is no right to the fetus' death.…”

Section: Gestaticide Is Harder To Justify Than Abortionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is as morally serious as infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings.

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Section: Gestaticide Is Harder To Justify Than Abortionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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“…Is the coupleeither together or separatelystill entitled to have the embryo destroyed, or are they morally obligated not to destroy it? 27,28,29,30 Again, our intuitions probably differ. But what seems to be relevant is whether the fetus itself is the sort of being whose life it is seriously morally wrong to end.…”

Section: Do Actual But Mindless Humans Deserve Our Moral Consideration?mentioning

confidence: 89%

Liberal Utilitarianism—Yes, But for Whom?

Räsänen¹

2020

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

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In his important paper “Just Better Utilitarianism,” Matti Häyry reminds his readers that liberal utilitarianism can offer a basis for moral and political choices in bioethics and thus could be helpful in decisionmaking.1 Although I agree with the general defense of Häyry’s liberal utilitarianism, in this commentary, I urge Häyry to say more on who belongs to our moral community. I challenge Häyry’s principle of actual or prospective existence. I also argue that Häyry should say more on human beings at the “margin of life” (such as fetuses and other mindless humans). I claim that debate over whether some form of utilitarianism is superior over other moral theories is not as important as answering the question underlying these issues: Who belongs to our moral community?

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“…Kaczor, Manninen, Hendricks, and Rodger et al, on the other hand, argue that infanticide is impermissible. [17][18][19][20][21] If infanticide is impermissible, then insofar as gestatelings share the same moral status as newborns, terminating gestatelings will be just as wrong as infanticide. So while I show that gestatelings share the same vii In what follows, I rely on an argument that resembles the form of one advanced by Alexander R. Pruss, though Pruss's argument occurs in a different context.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjects of ectogenesis: are ‘gestatelings’ fetuses, newborns or neither?

Colgrove

2019

J Med Ethics

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Subjects of ectogenesis—human beings that are developing in artificial wombs (AWs)—share the same moral status as newborns. To demonstrate this, I defend two claims. First, subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for a time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns (in the full sense of the word). Second, subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns. To defend the first claim, I rely on Elizabeth Chloe Romanis’s distinctions between fetuses, newborns and subjects of ectogenesis. For Romanis, the subject of partial ectogenesis ‘is neither a fetus nor a baby’ but is, instead, a ‘new product of human reproduction’. In this essay, I begin by, expanding upon Romanis’s argument that subjects of partial ectogenesis are not fetuses while arguing that those subjects are newborns. Next, I show that the distinction that Romanis draws between subjects of partial ectogenesis and newborns needs to be revised. The former is a kind of the latter. This leads us to an argument that shows why different moral statuses cannot be justifiably assigned to subjects of partial ectogenesis and subjects of complete ectogenesis, respectively. As subjects of partial ectogenesis share the same moral status as newborns, it follows that subjects of complete ectogenesis share the same moral status as newborns as well. Iconclude by considering implications that this essay may have for the research and development of AW technology and conceptual links between a subject’s moral status and birth.

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There is no right to the death of the fetus

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Liberal Utilitarianism—Yes, But for Whom?

Subjects of ectogenesis: are ‘gestatelings’ fetuses, newborns or neither?

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