There is No Alternative: Prospect Theory, the Yes Campaign and Selling the Good Friday Agreement

Abstract

A BSTRACT This article examines how the non-party 'Yes Campaign' orchestrated the successful passage of the 1998 referendum for the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. It argues that the Campaign's use of strategies based upon the tenets of prospect theory -focusing on the risks of failure rather than the benefits of success -had numerous impacts throughout the six-week campaign, ultimately resulting in the referendum's passage with enough unionist support to insulate the Agreement from some degree of criticism. The article does this by tracing the Campaign's main themes and the narratives surrounding their use by the Campaign itself, by other pro-agreement individuals and parties and by their reflection in voter choices and rationales for supporting the Agreement. More than 200 documents were analyzed, largely focusing on news accounts, but also including books, journal articles, websites, images and interviews with key players in the Campaign.

Consolidating peace and democracy in Northern Ireland: The role of civil society

“…37 Those who sold the agreement to the public in Northern Ireland, especially to the Protestant community, emphasized the risk of failure more than the promise of success. 38 The use of what Paul Dixon has identified as honourable deception by Tony Blair has undermined support of the Agreement and the peace process since the GFA was ratified. 39 Blair's effort to gain the support of Protestants to ratify and thereby legitimize the GFA led many Protestants to lose faith in the Agreement's ability to provide a framework for governing Northern Ireland effectively.…”

Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership, Risk, and Hope

“…In contrast to F. W. de Klerk, who called the 1992 referendum and personally led the successful campaign for a “yes” vote, Trimble—though he continued to voice support for the agreement—stayed largely on the sidelines during the campaign, apparently in response to the heat he had taken earlier. Supporters of the agreement repeatedly advised Trimble “to become more forthright and to engage in more active campaigning,” and in the final weeks before the vote Trimble did become more active (Hancock 2011, 103, 111). The “yes” vote ultimately succeeded among Protestants, but just barely, and many of those votes were shaky (Hayes and McAllister 2001).…”

Negotiated settlements and peace referendums

“…Conventional wisdom assumes that referendums will fail if the content of the peace agreement does not satisfy the most fundamental needs and fears of the public. Yet peace agreements unavoidably contain undesirable provisions subject to nationalist framing, and these are often intensified in contested referendums (Hancock 2011b; Ross ; Kaufman ). So, too, ratification attempts might fail because of the nature and timing of the process (Putnam ; see also Kersting ; Kaymak ).…”

“…For notable exceptions, see Trumbore (); Hancock (2001a, 2011b); Shamir and Shikaki (); Schultz (); Simeon ().…”