There<i>Is</i>a Special Problem of Scientific Representation

Boesch, Brandon

doi:10.1086/693989

Cited by 22 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…These liberal conceptions of representation also fail to account for communal aspects: what a given scientific model can represent depends on the history of the model, its construction and reception by scientific community. A model must be licensed by the community as a representation of its target (Boesch 2017). This licensing aspect is responsive to empirical and theoretical aims: not any mapping between the vehicle and target will do, and something more than stipulation is involved.…”

Section: Scientific Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Relationship Between Modelling Practices and Interpretive Stances in Quantum Mechanics

Ruyant

2021

Found Sci

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The purpose of this article is to establish a connection between modelling practices and interpretive approaches in quantum mechanics, taking as a starting point the literature on scientific representation. Different types of modalities (epistemic, practical, conceptual and natural) play different roles in scientific representation. I postulate that the way theoretical structures are interpreted in this respect affects the way models are constructed. In quantum mechanics, this would be the case in particular of initial conditions and observables. I examine two formulations of quantum mechanics, the standard wave-function formulation and the consistent histories formulation, and show that they correspond to opposite stances, which confirms my approach. Finally, I examine possible strategies for deciding between these stances. Interpreting Quantum MechanicsCan the literature on scientific representation, which is primarily concerned with modelling practices, inform us on the interpretation of quantum mechanics? Debates in metaphysics of science about the interpretation of scientific theories (in particular the theories of physics) are usually approached from a perspective that does not really take into account pragmatic aspects. Rather the question being asked is "What is the world like if the theory is true?", assuming the theory is "interpreted literally", or "taken at face value". Generally, the whole universe is considered as the proper object of inquiry, even though in practice, theories are more often used to represent bounded systems. Scientific realism is implicitly assumed, at least as a working hypothesis: scientific models are taken to accurately represent a mind-independent reality. However, in practice, model construction is sensitive to the purposes of epistemic agents, and the models that are used to represent physical systems are idealised, and not taken to represent their objects with perfect accuracy in all respects. In this

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Section: Scientific Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Relationship Between Modelling Practices and Interpretive Stances in Quantum Mechanics

Ruyant

2021

Found Sci

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“…Other conditions might be involved in specic contexts. He claims, in particular, that there are norms of valid inferences within some representational practice: inferences must be licensed by epistemic community (Suárez, 2015b;Boesch, 2017). But according to him, nothing more can be said about representation in full generality.…”

Section: The Problem Of Conditions Of Applicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semantic realism in the semantic conception of theories

Ruyant

2020

Synthese

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Semantic realism can be characterised as the idea that scientic theories are truth-bearers, and that they are true or false in virtue of the world. This notion is often assumed, but rarely discussed in the literature. I examine how it fares in the context of the semantic view of theories and in connection with the literature on scientic representation. Making sense of semantic realism requires specifying the conditions of application of theoretical models, even for models that are not actually used, which leads to several diculties. My conclusion is that semantic realism is far more demanding than one would expect. Finally, I briey examine some pragmatist alternatives.

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“…It may thus be said to be a platitude about scientific modeling and representation that all models are at least in principle able to license some inferences regarding their target. The main point of building a model is to allow such surrogative inferences, and it is such inference-drawing actions (Boesch 2017), if anything at all, that are constitutive of communal representing acts. 6 A substantive account of representation assumes that this fact about surrogative inference stands to be explained by ulterior facts regarding the nature of the representational relation between representational sources and targets.…”

Section: Means and Constituents Of Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nor are such cases confined to mathematical physics. In marine ecological biology, the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey populations in a competitive environment, for example, has been amply discussed in the philosophical literature (Weisberg 2007;Boesch 2017;Knuuttila and Loettgers 2017). This is easy to understand in terms of isomorphisms operating between those relations holding among the quantities in the model source (which obey a couple of straightforward nonlinear equations and thus can easily put in a struc-tural format) and the empirically observed ratios in actual populations of fish in the Adriatic sea (as reported by D'Ancona and which formed the empirical basis of the outcome-oriented model by Volterra, in particular; see Knuuttila andLoettgers 2017, 1027ff.).…”

Section: Structural Means and Surrogativementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead RSC recommends accepting the practice up front, by considering modeling as an inherently outcome-driven normative practice. If scientific models and scientific theories reflect and embody their intended uses and aims essentially, this is only because the practice that gives rise to and generates them is essentially intentional (Boesch 2017). No account of theory in terms of modeling that denies such a fundamental lesson can succeed.…”

Section: The Structural Semantic Conceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Representational Semantic Conception

Suárez¹,

Pero²

2019

Philos. of Sci.

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This article argues for a representational semantic conception (RSC) of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely, that theories can be characterized as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of 'models' and 'structures', which we reject. The practice turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modeling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.

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ThereIsa Special Problem of Scientific Representation

Cited by 22 publications

References 27 publications

On the Relationship Between Modelling Practices and Interpretive Stances in Quantum Mechanics

On the Relationship Between Modelling Practices and Interpretive Stances in Quantum Mechanics

Semantic realism in the semantic conception of theories

The Representational Semantic Conception

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