There Are No Irrational Emotions

Abstract

Folk and philosophers alike argue whether particular emotions are rational. However, these debates presuppose that emotions are eligible for rationality. Drawing on examples of how we manage our own emotions through strategies such as taking medication, I argue that the general permissibility of such management demonstrates that emotions are ineligible for rationality. It follows that emotions are never irrational or rational. Because neither perception nor emotion is eligible for rationality, this reveals a significant epistemic continuity between them, lending support to perceptual views of emotion.Here I propose a novel difficulty for this view helpfully illustrated through emotion regulation or the processes by which we manage what emotions we have. 1 For example, one might feel calm or happy, rather than anxious or depressed, as a result of meditating, listening to music, or taking medication. Moreover, mental states that are eligible for rationality, such as beliefs, are irrational when we manage them in the ways that we manage our emotions. Accordingly, I aim to demonstrate that emotion regulation 293