Theory of mind broad and narrow: Reasoning about social exchange engages ToM areas, precautionary reasoning does not

Abstract

Baron-Cohen (1995) proposed that the theory of mind (TOM) inference system evolved to promote strategic social interaction. Social exchange-a form of cooperation for mutual benefit-involves strategic social interaction and requires TOM inferences about the contents of other individual's mental states, especially their desires, goals, and intentions. There are behavioral and neuropsychological dissociations between reasoning about social exchange and reasoning about equivalent problems tapping other, more general, content domains. It has therefore been proposed that social exchange behavior is regulated by social contract algorithms: a domain-specific inference system that is functionally specialized for reasoning about social exchange. We report an fMRI study using the Wason selection task that provides further support for this hypothesis. Precautionary rules share so many properties with social exchange rulesthey are conditional, deontic, and involve subjective utilities-that most reasoning theories claim they are processed by the same neurocomputational machinery. Nevertheless, neuroimagingshows that reasoning about social exchange activates brain areas not activated by reasoning about precautionary rules, and vice versa. As predicted, neural correlates of theory of mind (anterior and posterior temporal cortex) were activated when subjects interpreted social exchange rules, but not precautionary rules (where TOM inferences are unnecessary). We argue that the interaction between TOM and social contract algorithms can be reciprocal: social contract algorithms requires TOM inferences, but their functional logic also allows TOM inferences to be made. By considering interactions between TOM in the narrower sense (belief-desire reasoning) and all the social inference systems that create the logic of human social interaction-ones that enable as well as use inferences about the content of mental states-a broader conception of theory of mind may emerge: a computational model embodying a Theory of Human Nature (TOHN). Social exchange reasoning engages TOM 3A fierce debate over the nature of the human mind has raged over the last two decades, and the study of reasoning has been a principal battleground. Broadly construed, reasoning is the ability to generate new representations of the world-new knowledge-from given or observed information. It is often considered constitutive of human intelligence: the most distinctly human cognitive ability, often thought to exist in opposition to, and as a replacement for, instinct.Discovering the nature of the inferential procedures whereby new knowledge is generated is, therefore, a foundational task of the cognitive sciences, with implications for every branch of the social sciences (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).One side of the reasoning debate has defended a long-standing and traditional view of the evolved architecture of the human mind: that it is a blank slate, a neurocomputational system equipped with content-free inferential procedures that operate uniformly on information ...

Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters

“…Fueled by these observations, biologists and game theorists developed models that outlined how the fitness benefits to be reaped from gains in trade can, under the right envelope of conditions, drive the evolution of decision-making adaptations for successfully engaging in direct reciprocity (1)(2)(3)(4)(5). Indeed, a broad array of experimental and neuroscientific evidence has accumulated over the last two decades supporting the hypothesis that our species' decision-making architecture includes both cognitive and motivational specializations whose design features are specifically tailored to enable gains through direct reciprocity (e.g., detection of defectors and punitive sentiment toward defectors) (6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16).…”

Neuroeconomics, Naturalism, and Language

“…This seems to be one possible adaptationist explanation for the fact that the cognitive system of humans is not guided by a general purpose rationality even in the case of exchange relations, but by special decision modules that focus on the detection of cheating and the maintenance and control of implicit social contracts . These can be shown to match activation patterns in the brain that correspond to the 'theory of mind' pattern (Ermer et al, 2006).…”

Adaptive specializations, social exchange, and the evolution of human intelligence

“…In support of the deontic position, its advocates point out that another type of deontic conditional that we and others have worked on also elicits good violation detection on the Wason task: precautionary rules (19,20,24,36,39). These are conditionals that fit the template "if one is to engage in hazardous activity H, then one must take precaution P" (e.g., "if you are working with toxic gases, then you must wear a gas mask").…”

“…For nearly three decades, we have been studying human reasoning in the light of evolution (14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25). By integrating results from evolutionary game theory with the ecology of hunter-gatherer life, we developed social contract theory: a task analysis specifying what computational properties a neurocognitive system would need to generate adaptive inferences and behavior in the social exchange problem domain (25).…”