Theory of Conjectural Variations

Figuières, Charles; Jean-Marie, Alain; Quérou, Nicolas; Tidball, Mabel

doi:10.1142/5453

Cited by 43 publications

(26 citation statements)

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“…Theoretically, they allow for an extended range of behaviors (see Figuières et al, 2004, for a book-length discussion of the theory of conjectures and for further references). 1 In aggregative games, conjectures can be seen as beliefs about the reaction of the aggregate.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective

Possajennikov

2015

Mathematical Social Sciences

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Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective

Possajennikov

2015

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…As is mentioned in [15] and [16], the concept of conjectural variations has been the subject of numerous theoretical controversies; e.g., see [17]. Nevertheless, economists have made extensive use of one form or the other of the CVE to predict the outcome of noncooperative behavior in several areas of economics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, economists have made extensive use of one form or the other of the CVE to predict the outcome of noncooperative behavior in several areas of economics. The literature on conjectural variations has focused mainly on two-player games: cf., [15], because a serious conceptual difficulty arises if the number of agents is greater than two: see, [15], [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partially Mixed Duopoly and Oligopoly: Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium (CCVE). Part 1

Kalashnikov¹,

Kalashnykova²,

Camacho³

2013

Procedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Knowledge Discovery, Knowledge Management and Decision Support

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In this paper, we consider a model of partially mixed duopoly with conjectured variations equilibrium (CVE). The agents' conjectures concern the price variations depending upon their production output's increase or decrease. We establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectured variations equilibrium (called an exterior equilibrium) for any set of feasible conjectures. To introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium, we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures (referred to as influence coefficients) and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (understood as a CVE with consistent conjectures). To prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non-differentiable demand functions, we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function's derivative with respect to the market price.

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“…Here it is assumed that both players conjecture a reaction function γ i (u j ) of their opponent in function of their own decision. If the resulting best responses u * i and conjectured reactions coincide these responses are called a consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (see [7] or [25]). …”

Section: Choice Of Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Engwerda¹

2012

SSRN Journal

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In this note we sketch a dynamic framework within which the discussion on the macro economic effects of climate change take place. The problem setting is characterized by scientific uncertainties about the development of climate, potential large economic losses and human beings having their specific features. Some considerations about climate change, macroeconomics and their relationship are given. A characteristic feature of the problem setting is that there are multiple decision makers interacting in a dynamic world with large uncertainties. Problems of this type have been studied extensively by (dynamic) game theory. A rough literature review is provided and some items open for future research are indicated.

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Theory of Conjectural Variations

Cited by 43 publications

References 0 publications

Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective

Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective

Partially Mixed Duopoly and Oligopoly: Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium (CCVE). Part 1

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

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