Theory-based considerations influence the interpretation of generic sentences

Abstract

Under what circumstances do people agree that a kind-referring generic sentence (e.g., “Swans are beautiful”) is true? We hypothesized that theory-based considerations are sufficient, independently of prevalence/frequency information, to lead to acceptance of a generic statement. To provide evidence for this general point, we focused on demonstrating the impact of a specific theory-based, essentialist expectation–that the physical features characteristic of a biological kind emerge as a natural product of development–on participants’ reasoning about generics. Across 3 studies, adult participants (N = 99) confirmed our hypothesis, preferring to map generic sentences (e.g., “Dontrets have long tails”) onto novel categories for which the key feature (e.g., long tails) was absent in all the young but present in all the adults rather than onto novel categories for which the key feature was at least as prevalent but present in some of the young and in some of the adults. Control conditions using “some”- and “most”-quantified sentences demonstrated that this mapping is specific to generic meaning. These results suggest that generic meaning does not reduce to quantification and is sensitive to theory-based expectations.

Children's interpretations of general quantifiers, specific quantifiers and generics

“…A range of evidence suggests that generic generalizations, unlike quantified generalizations, are sensitive to rich semantic and causal factors – not just to the statistical prevalence of the property among members of the kind (e.g., Brandone et al, 2012; Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010; Cimpian, Gelman, & Brandone, 2010; Khemlani et al, 2012; Leslie, 2008, 2012; Prasada et al, 2013). Thus, if generic generalizations are indeed a fundamental, default mode of generalizing, then this suggests that the cognitive system is profoundly attuned to such factors, which go far beyond unstructured statistical distributions.…”

“Good job, you’re so smart”: The effects of inconsistency of praise type on young children’s motivation

“…Children as young as 2 years of age were able to distinguish generic statements from nongeneric statements and use this information to create different expectations about kinds (Cimpian & Markman, 2008;Gelman & Raman, 2003;Heyman & Gelman, 1999). Generic statements convey information more central to a category than do nongeneric statements (Cimpian, Gelman, & Brandone, 2010;Gelman, 2003). For example, stating that ''cows have hooves" goes beyond the information of any individual cow and implies a stable factor common to all members of the category.…”

“…Because generic praise implies that a stable trait underlies goal achievement, perhaps hearing some nongeneric praise along with generic praise makes this relation less clear (and vice versa). One possibility is that the relative weights of each type of praise are different (as suggested by Cimpian et al (2010)). That is, hearing a small amount of one type might be more influential than hearing a small amount of the other type.…”

Quantified statements are recalled as generics: Evidence from preschool children and adults

“…We predicted, following Leslie et al (2011), that adults would have a tendency to recall statements quantified with “all” as generics, but what about “most” and “some”? Although several experiments have shown that adults differentiate “most” from generics (e.g., Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010; Cimpian Gelman, & Brandone, 2010), no experiments have yet been conducted to test whether “most” statements are ever interpreted as generics. We predicted that “most” statements would also tend to be recalled as generics, since “most” conveys information that applies broadly to the members of the kind.…”

“…Generic generalizations, in contrast, cannot be characterized in these terms, but rather reflect richer and more complex relations between the kind and the property, which cannot be reduced to purely formal, quantitative terms (Carlson, 1977; Leslie, 2007). The precise nature of generic generalizations is not yet fully understood (but see Cimpian, Gelman, & Brandone, 2010; Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010; Khemlani, Leslie, & Glucksberg, 2009, in press; Leslie, 2007, 2008; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009 for some important work).…”