Theorising indirect coercion: The logic of triangular strategies

Smetana, Michal; Ludvík, Jan

doi:10.1177/0047117819836691

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(24 reference statements)

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“…Our purpose was to develop theory inductively (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013). Our analysis was guided by an interpretive methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to capture the subjective meanings that are at the core of the constructivist perspective (Adler, 1997). We aimed to reconstruct the Swiss targets' interpretations, thus focusing on their patterns of argumentation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001;Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010) and how and why these interpretations were triggered.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We refer to the indirect coercion mechanism that induced Swiss policy makers to change the banking secrecy institution as indirect compellence. 2 Similar mechanisms have been addressed in armed conflict research (Smetana and Ludvik, 2019; see also Schelling, 1966;Harkavy, 1998;Honneland, 1998;Carter, 2015) and in particular in research on hostage-taking, which can be considered the prototypical example of indirect compellence (see, e.g., Antokol and Nudell, 1990;Buhite, 1995;Allen, 2006). 3 Hence indirect compellence means that a coercer (A, henceforth referred to as hostage taker) instrumentally uses a third party (C, henceforth referred to as hostage) as a resource to increase its coercive power over the target (B) (Borowsky, 2011).…”

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confidence: 83%

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Indirect Compellence and Institutional Change: U.S. Extraterritorial Law Enforcement and the Erosion of Swiss Banking Secrecy

Überbacher

2019

Administrative Science Quarterly

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Based on an in-depth, qualitative case study about a conflict between governmental authorities from the United States and Switzerland over the regulation of Swiss banks, we introduce indirect compellence as a novel triadic and indirect mechanism through which coercion leads to institutional change. Hostage-taking being a prototypical example, indirect compellence is typified by a coercive actor who takes a third party hostage to gain influence over a targeted actor. In our case, it meant that U.S. authorities (coercers) compelled Swiss policy makers (targets) to erode the famed Swiss banking secrecy rules by threatening the targets to otherwise enforce U.S. law extraterritorially against Swiss banks and bankers (hostages). Our constructivist and target-centered perspective explains this type of coercive pressure in detail, and it also suggests that targeted policy makers judge and respond to it contingent on their political ideologies. Our study contributes to research on power and influence in institutional environments and to research on global business regulation and transnational governance. Most generally, it also expands scholarly understanding of triadic relationships. In contrast to Simmelian perspectives’ focus on triads in which the third party is in a powerful brokerage position and frequently benefits as a tertius gaudens, our study suggests that the third party can also become a rather powerless tertius miserabilis who suffers rather than benefits from others’ conflict.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 83%

Indirect Compellence and Institutional Change: U.S. Extraterritorial Law Enforcement and the Erosion of Swiss Banking Secrecy

Überbacher

2019

Administrative Science Quarterly

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“…The most comprehensive attempt to overcome the fragmentation in the literature was made by Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvik, who explain that unlike classic two-actor coercive dyads, in "indirect coercion" the coercer seeks "to alter the strategic choices of the target by drawing an intermediary into the conflict," thus producing a triangular interaction (Smetana and Ludvik, 2019). Drawing on three successful cases of indirect coercion, they propose three paths by which a coercer can manipulate an intermediary against an elusive target.…”

Section: Different Strands Of Triangular Coercion Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…. motivations of actors to alter their policies even when the threatened punitive action is not directed towards themselves” (Smetana and Ludvik, 2019).…”

Section: Different Strands Of Triangular Coercion Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Re-conceptualizing triangular coercion in International Relations

Sobelman¹

2022

Cooperation and Conflict

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Although coercion literature has traditionally focused on two-actor dyads, coercion in three-actor settings is a prevalent yet understudied strategy in International Relations. Such cases of “triangular coercion” represent a phenomenon whereby a coercer who lacks direct leverage over a resilient target coerces a third party who does possess leverage over the target, and to whom the target is vulnerable, and manipulates it into a clash of interests with the target. By forcing an otherwise uninvolved intermediary to align with the coercer, a coercer can alter the balance of vulnerability vis-à-vis its otherwise resilient target and enhance its susceptibility to coercion, albeit by extension. Existing scholarship tackles triangular coercion from different angles and mostly focuses on actor typology. This article seeks to promote our understanding of this strategy by proposing a conceptual model that distills its logic into the abstract components of vulnerability, resilience, and leverage. To demonstrate the dynamics of triangular coercion, the article draws on three empirical cases: Israel’s failed attempts to force Lebanon to rein in Hezbollah in the 1990s, Nazi Germany’s successful manipulation of Britain and France into coercing Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the Soviet Union’s success at forcing the United States to coerce Israel in 1973.

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