Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches

Crenshaw, Martha

doi:10.1080/01402398708437313

Cited by 145 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…We argue that terrorist actors, despite the gruesome nature of their crimes, can be considered rational actors (Crenshaw 2001;LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Kruglanski and colleagues (2009) characterize the reasons for violent participation as a quest for personal significance; other scholars highlight the common terrorist goal of recognition and fame (Hamm 2004).…”

Section: Rational Choice Predictions Of Terrorist Behaviormentioning

confidence: 95%

“…This reinsertion policy allowed ETA members to live normal lives, free from ETA (Mees 2003). The Italian government offered leniency to members of the Red Brigades when they provided information that led to the apprehension of other members (Crenshaw 2001;Cronin 2006). In all of these examples, governments strategically raised the expected utility of choosing a violence-free life for known terrorists.…”

Section: Targets Of Rewards (Or Conciliation)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Israel continues to experience violent attacks by Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah-affiliated organizations-all of whom are sensitive to and dependent on sympathy and support from the Palestinian population, the vast majority of whom would not engage in terrorist activities as their default choice (Bloom 2004;Hafez 2006). As mentioned earlier, most terrorist groups rely on willing recruits to survive (Crenshaw 2001). Moreover, these groups are much more likely to endure when the surrounding population is either complicit in their activities, sympathetic toward them, or convinced that informing Israelis will result in swift retaliation from the terrorist groups themselves (Kalyvas 2006;Kocher and Kalyvas 2007;Lyall and Wilson 2009).…”

Section: The Second Intifada (2000 To 2004)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Moving Beyond Deterrence

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Rational choice approaches have long suggested that reducing unwanted behavior requires raising the costs (or perceived costs) of a behavior through the threat of punishment-a process commonly referred to as deterrence. In the eighteenth century, Beccaria ([1764] 1983) argued that the state should punish law-breakers just enough so that the burdens of punishment outweigh any pleasure derived from perpetrating the crime-an idea that directly informs U.S. criminal law, military strategy, and a host of other social policy domains. Scholars have since applied the notion of deterrence to a range of areas, including nuclear doctrine (Brodie 1959) AbstractRational choice approaches to reducing terrorist violence would suggest raising the costs of terrorism through punishment, thereby reducing the overall expected utility of terrorism. In this article, we argue that states should also consider raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism through rewards. We test effects of repressive (or punishing) and conciliatory (or rewarding) actions on terrorist behavior using the newly developed GATE-Israel dataset, which identifies events by Israeli state actors toward Palestinian targets on a full range of counterterrorism tactics and policies from 1987 to 2004. Results show that repressive actions are either unrelated to terror or related to subsequent increases in terror, and conciliatory actions are generally related to decreases in terror, depending on the tactical period. Findings also reveal the importance of understanding the role of terrorists' constituencies for reducing violence.

show abstract

Section: Rational Choice Predictions Of Terrorist Behaviormentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Targets Of Rewards (Or Conciliation)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Second Intifada (2000 To 2004)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Moving Beyond Deterrence

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Through the comparison between instrumental model (strategic model) and organizational model, Crenshaw(1987) touches on the incentives for group members within internal processes of organizations for their survival. He suggests two incentives: (1) ideological incentive and (2) the sense of solidarity.…”

Section: Journal Of Public Administration and Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Organizational Behavior of Terrorist Groups

Jung

Lee

2015

jpag

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Terror attacks have been typically performed by group members, which implies that perpetrators were not independent actors, but acted violently as being part of a larger group. In addition, the execution of terrorist attacks is not only facilitated by macro-level factors but also as the tools to increase payoffs, survival, and maintenance at the group level. As links between disgruntled individuals and society, organizational behavior elements are something that needs to be examined. In this paper, several organizational behavior theories to compare were applied and contrast between terrorist groups and normal organizations under the categories of mobilizations, decision-making, and leadership.

show abstract

“…These objectives depend on the group's ideology, though its ability to reach its objectives is constrained by its capacities and the environment in which it operates (Crenshaw 1988). 4 That is, a group's characteristics reflect its ideology, capacity, and environment; the following sections briefly review how each characteristic might affect a group's lethality and activity.…”

Section: Activity Versus Lethality: Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, and environment

Mierau¹

2014

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What determines the activity and lethality of militant groups? To answer this question, a two-step count method disentangles activity and lethality in terms of ideology, capacity, and environmental factors. A first step assesses the determinants of group activity, measured by the number of incidents in which a group was involved. The second step considers the number of fatalities, conditional on the number of incidents.Similar factors drive militant group activity and lethality, but some links are stronger than others. Specifically, ideological factors are particularly strong determinants of lethality; capacity and environmental factors matter more for activity.

show abstract

Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches

Cited by 145 publications

References 2 publications

Moving Beyond Deterrence

Moving Beyond Deterrence

Organizational Behavior of Terrorist Groups

The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, and environment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About