Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games

Croson, Rachel

doi:10.1037/e683302011-039

Cited by 161 publications

(175 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Consistent with Croson (1998), we find that participants in the VCM attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. Subjects in the WLM, in contrast, attempt to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 73%

“…See, e.g., Sugden (1984), Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbey (1997), Croson (1998), Sonnemans et al (1999), Fischbacher et al (2001), Keser and van Winden (2000), and Brandts and Schram (2001). Table 1.…”

Section: Iii2 Conditional Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We follow Croson (1998) For the VCM, we use the average allocation to the public good of the other three members of your group in the previous period as this measure. Croson (1998) showed that this average is salient to the participants and related to their own allocations.…”

Section: Iii2 Conditional Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

2005

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Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others. Keywords ABSTRACTPrevious experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation).Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participa nts contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group. JEL Classifications:C72, C92, D44, H41

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 73%

Section: Iii2 Conditional Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

2005

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“…Also, past research has indicated that reciprocity has more predictive power than altruism related theories. Similar to other studies, Croson (1999) finds that group-account allocations are significantly positively related to both the group allocations of other subjects, and to beliefs about those allocations, providing strong support for reciprocity theories.…”

Section: Conjecturessupporting

confidence: 71%

The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments

Halloran¹,

Walker²,

Williams³

Research in Experimental Economics

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This paper examines binding multi-round commitments to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make multi-round commitments does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the multi-round commitments treatment.

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“…This pattern of behavior is highly robust and known as "conditional cooperation" (see, Croson 1998, Keser and van Winden 2000, Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001, Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter 2003.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing for Team Spirit - An Experimental Study

Sausgruber

2003

SSRN Journal

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Team spirit is often suggested as a counter-balancing power to free-riding. Testing for team spirit with field data is difficult, however, due to an inherent identification problem. In this paper we use experimental methods to identify team spirit against potential confounding factors. In a team work task we vary subjects' information about relative team performance while we leave unchanged the structure of explicit incentives. We find that subjects contribute more to their team's project when teams observe each others' performance. We discriminate team spirit as implication of mutual peer pressure between teams as cause for this result.

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Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games

Cited by 161 publications

References 68 publications

Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments

Testing for Team Spirit - An Experimental Study

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