Theories of Actuality

Adams, Robert

doi:10.2307/2214751

Cited by 338 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…4 Most other philosophers who work with possible worlds take some form of the Equivalence Principle to be such a truism that they rarely bother to explicitly endorse it, much less attempt to derive it. This is true, for example, of almost all of the abstractionists about possible worlds, such as Adams (1974), Plantinga (1974, 44-46), Stalnaker (1976), Chisholm (1981), Pollock (1984), Prior (1968), andSider (2002, 299). A notable exception is the attempted derivation in Plantinga (1985) though, unfortunately, his attempt failed in various ways.…”

Section: P ↔ ∃W(w | = P)mentioning

confidence: 97%

The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory

Menzel

Zalta

2013

J Philos Logic

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only if there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small models and hence that its ontological commitments -and, therefore, those of the fundamental principle of world theory -are minimal.

show abstract

Section: P ↔ ∃W(w | = P)mentioning

confidence: 97%

The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory

Menzel

Zalta

2013

J Philos Logic

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, Nolan (1997) favours an approach where (in his terminology) 'propositions'-the meanings of sentences and the objects of thought-are taken to be the fundamental entities from which worlds are constructed. On this picture, possible worlds are maximal consistent sets of propositions à la Adams (1974), while impossible worlds are those sets of propositions which are inconsistent and/or non-maximal. Adopting this view, we could let L simply be the class of all propositions qua objects of thought, trivialising the question as to whether L is 'expressively rich enough' to capture every belief that α might have.…”

Section: The Expressibility Hypothesis (Again)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Impossible worlds and partial belief

Elliott

2017

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of the propositions which can be constructed from possible and impossible worlds are in an important sense inexpressible; leaving the probabilistic model committed to saying that agents in general have at least as many attitudes towards inexpressible propositions as they do towards expressible propositions. If it is reasonable to think that our attitudes are generally expressible, then a model with such commitments looks problematic.

show abstract

“…If one takes possible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions [as per (Adams 1974)], impossible worlds could be sets of propositions that are locally inconsistent and/or incomplete. Similarly, Plantingan ersatzism (worlds are particular states of affairs) or Stalnakerian ersatzism (worlds are world-natures or maximal properties) could be easily extended to impossible worlds.…”

Section: Without This Restriction One Could Conclude That What Is Immentioning

confidence: 99%

Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism

Sendłak

2014

Axiomathes

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of Hybrid Modal Realism as a general theory of modalities, i.e. one that gives an analysis of possibilities as well as impossibilities. To do so we will firstly sketch the goals that theories of impossible worlds should achieve. Secondly we will briefly present the two most popular accounts of impossibilities-Extended Modal Realism and Extended Ersatzism. We will focus on the aspects of both theories which became the motivation for a hybrid view. In the last part of this paper we will analyze Francesco Berto's Hybrid Modal Realism and present reasons why this account is an insufficient tool for analyzing impossibilities.

show abstract

Theories of Actuality

Cited by 338 publications

References 5 publications

The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory

The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory

Impossible worlds and partial belief

Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About