Theoretical analysis of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution systems integrated into fiber-optic communication lines using dense wavelength division multiplexing

Measurement-device-independent continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol operation in optical transport networks

“…Interestingly, for the case of MDI CV-QKD, configurations for which the quantum channel is located in the C-band appeared to be more efficient in terms of their maximal achievable distances. For most cases, configurations with Oband-located quantum channel are more beneficial (MDI QKD as well, see [22]), as FWM noise does not contribute to the overall losses. Though the overall contribution of channel noises here is less for such cases too, fiber attenuation for the quantum channel wavelength of 1310 nm surpasses them significantly.…”

“…Similarly to the work [21], four allocation schemes for the quantum channel located in C-band and O-band of the telecommunication window were considered. The criterion and complete explanation for such a choice is provided in detail in the works [22,23]. The final choice of the configurations considered in the further numerical simulations is given in Table 1.…”

Continuous-Variable Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution in the Terahertz Band

“…Among these attacks, attacks on detectors play a major role, including local oscillator attacks, wavelength attacks, detector blinding attacks [40][41][42][43][44], and so on. To address the security vulnerabilities of detectors of the practical THz CVQKD, inspired by optical-waveband measurementdevice-independent (MDI) QKD [45][46][47][48][49], we introduce THz CV-MDI-QKD. MDI-QKD is a protocol immune to detector attacks, where Alice and Bob send unrelated quantum states to an untrusted third party, Charlie.…”