Theism and modal realism

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the classical theistic conception of God and modal realism. I suggest that realism about possible worlds has unwelcome consequences for that conception. First, that modal realism entails the necessity of divine existence eludes explanation in a way congenial to a commitment to both modal realism and classical theism. Second, divine knowledge is dependent on worlds independent of the creative role and action of God, thereby suggesting a limitation on the nature of divine knowledge and on the nature of God's creative role. Third, modal realism indicates the existence of real, albeit non-actual, worlds of appalling evil threatening the classical conception of divine omnipotence and benevolence.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

“…But, there is a better reason for rejecting it, if one is a theist. For instance, Paul Sheehy (2006) has argued that the two views are incompatible. More recently, Ross Cameron (2009) has argued that Sheehy's criticisms are misguided, and that Lewis's modal realism is well-equipped to deal with them.…”

On the plurality of gods

“…Another approach to modality is the modal realism of David Lewis (1968; 1986). 29 Divine necessity and Lewisian modal realism seem to imply that our god has counterparts (see Le Poidevin (1996), 27–31; Sheehy (2006); for a contrary opinion, see Cameron (2009) ).…”

“…30.Monotheists say x is a god only if x is the source of the being of all other things (see Le Poidevin (1996), 30). Ordinal polytheists say x is a god at some world only if x is the source of the being of all the other things at that world (Sheehy (2006), 319).…”

God’s Necessity on Anselmian Theistic Genuine Modal Realism

“…1 The first section provides an exposition of GMR, and the remaining sections explore the ontological options for God on an AT-GMR framework. In my exploration of the ontological options for God on AT-GMR, I assess the recent contributions by Sheehy (2006Sheehy ( , 2009, Davis (2008Davis ( , 2009) and Vance (2016) and the work of their critics, Oppy (2009), Cameron (2009) and Almeida (2011Almeida ( , 2017, rebutting some of Sheehy, Davis and Vance's respective arguments, supporting others and making novel ones of my own. Here are the options: If God is concrete, then there are three ways to analyse God's necessity on AT-GMR: the first is through counterpart theory, which-I argueleads to AT-GMR's positing an infinite plurality of Gods and thereby being inconsistent; the second is through transworld identity, which-I argue-leads to, amongst other things, modal collapse; and the third is through taking God as the aggregate of all His counterparts, which-I argue-amongst other things, firstly leads to AT-GMR denying God's simplicity and thereby being inconsistent and secondly leads to modal collapse again.…”