Theism and Explanationist Defenses of Moral Realism

Brenner, Andrew

doi:10.5840/faithphil20181016111

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…This sort of claim has been made by a number of theists, including Adams (1983), 751; Idem (1999), 363–366; Swinburne (2004), 215–218; Rogers (2008); Linville (2009), 393–417; Evans (2013), 121, 179–81; Thurow (2013), 1601; Brenner (2018), 456–457.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 94%

How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4?

Brenner

2019

Rel. Stud.

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Sometimes theists wonder how God's beliefs track particular portions of reality, e.g. contingent states of affairs, or facts regarding future free actions. In this article I sketch a general model for how God's beliefs track reality. God's beliefs track reality in much the same way that propositions track reality, namely via grounding. Just as the truth values of true propositions are generally or always grounded in their truthmakers, so too God's true beliefs are grounded in the subject matters of those beliefs (i.e. God believes that p in virtue of the fact that p). This is not idle speculation, since my proposal allows the theist to account for God's true beliefs regarding causally inert portions of reality.Religious Studies,

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 94%

How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4?

Brenner

2019

Rel. Stud.

Self Cite

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Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism

Jeffrey

2021

EJPR

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Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. “Theism” leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God’s existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God’s relation to the natural world.

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Theism and Explanationist Defenses of Moral Realism

Cited by 2 publications

References 14 publications

How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4?

How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4?

Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism

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