Their Boot in Our Face No Longer? Administrative Sectionalism and Resistance to Federal Authority in the U.S. South

Abstract

What explains state agency resistance to actions taken by their federal counterparts? And do sectional tensions make state bureaucratic nonacquiescence particularly likely in the U.S. South? We theorize that state resistance to federal administrative policy is more likely among Southern state bureaus due to administrative sectionalism. We argue that state agencies can and do resist federal administrative orders independent of other political constraints. This study is among the first to consider the policy consequences of sectionalism in state bureaucracies. We test our claims by employing a mixed methods approach that analyzes each instance of litigation and intervention by state bureaucrats in opposition to actions and orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from 2010 to 2017. We find that, all else equal, state agency resistance to federal utility policy is about 3.75 times as likely among Southern utility regulators. This research has important normative implications for administrative politics as it suggests agencies with putatively apolitical policy jurisdiction have political preferences driven by sectional tension.

Interplay between Competing and Coexisting Policy Regimens within Supply Chain Configurations

“…Industrial contexts where CACPs are evident include agriculture, renewable energy, and pharmaceuticals, where different incentives, standards, and/ or regulatory models operate (see Table 1). Within federal systems, policy tensions often arise when state institutions challenge policies promulgated by federal agencies (Napolio and Peterson 2021). Of particular concern to policy makers are implications on equity (Bertsimas et al, 2012) and shifts in the bargaining power of supply chain actors (Crook and Combs, 2007), which are particularly difficult to assess within a CACP context.…”

Executive coalition building

“…Work on networked governance has considered how agencies collaborate with each other and private entities Rossi 2011, 2012;McGuire 2006;Resh et al 2014;Siddiki et al 2017), yet it often fails to consider the political environment in which agencies operate. Several studies do consider how overlapping jurisdictions affect bureaucratic policymaking, but they either focus on congressional incentives to concentrate or fragment authority (Bils 2019;Farhang and Yaver 2016;Ting 2003) or how overlapping jurisdictions might create inefficiencies like free-riding, turf wars, or preference cycling (Bils 2019;Hammond and Miller 1985;Herrera, Reuben and Ting 2017;Napolio and Carr Peterson 2019;Ting 2003). Here, however, I argue bureaucrats take advantage of overlapping jurisdictions by building coalitions in order to forge autonomy and achieve their policy goals.…”