The World of Regulatory Influence

Abstract

Models of firms' influence over the regulatory agencies that oversee them have traditionally been constrained by several factors, including a lack of direct measures of "influence," an inability to account for variations in the institutional environment within which firms operate, and a nearly singular focus on industry-level measures of interest group strengths. In this paper, we employ a global database and novel measures to provide a fresh look at the determinants of firms' influence over regulatory agencies. We find that in addition to traditional industry-level determinants, important country-level institutional and firm-level determinants affect firms' regulatory agency influence. We also find that regulatory process variations affect firms' influence over regulators. With these empirical estimates in hand, we generate a Regulatory Influence Index that ranks influence levels of typical firms that operate in each sample country in the dataset, and then discuss the substantial country-level variation in regulatory agency influence that obtains.

Analysis of the efficiency of levers in the context of implementation of the state regulatory policy

“…From this point of view, the most valuable are the works by the American scholars J. Mayo and J. Macher (2012Macher ( , 2015 [6; 15], who proposed to calculate the index of regulatory influence to determine how organisations in different countries influence the process of making regulatory decisions. It has been discovered that not only the traditional factors of influence at the level of industry, but also institutional factors at the country level, as well as a uniqueness of its activity provide an important source of regulatory influence of the organisation.…”

“…Problems related to regulatory levers and their classification are researched in the works by scientists such as Y. Ivanov and A. Kizym (Ivanov, Kizym, 2008) [1], I. Kobushko and Y. Kobushko (Kobushko, Kobushko, 2015) [2], P. Lascoumes and P. Le Gales (Lascoumes, Le Gales, 2007) [3], T. Lobunets (Lobunets, 2013) [4], P. Lunn (Lunn, 2014) [5], J. Macher and J. Mayo (Macher, Mayo, 2012) [6], V. Polyuha (Lobunets, 2005) [7], I. Radionova (Radionova, 2013) [8], N. Ruban and I. Chuynitska (Ruban, Chuynitska, 2010) [9], O. Tishchenko and K. Golyakova (Tishchenko, Golyakova, 2012) [10] and others.…”

Corporate political strategy and liability of foreignness: Similarities and differences between local and foreign firms in the South African Health Sector

“…Firm size can be measured by sales, assets, market share or number of employees and is often a representation for available resources (Hillman et al, 2004). Firms with added resources are more likely to engage policymakers and do so alone, while those with fewer resources often act collectively with others (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;Macher & Mayo, 2012). Firms with greater market power are more politically active and influential as are those firms that are membership of an industry association (Weymouth, 2013).…”

“…It is expected that foreign firms' chosen course of action is reinforced by the practise and success in their home countries (Hillman et al, 2004). Firms with added resources are also more likely to engage policymakers than those with limited resources (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;Macher & Mayo, 2012). Starting on the backfoot due to LOF, a proactive approach would seem even more essential to achieve success.…”

Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy

“…This work has primarily sought to identify the factors that determine the use and efficacy of political activity. Political scientists, economists, and management scholars have highlighted firm-and industry-level heterogeneity as important predictors of political activity, pointing to factors like firm size, liquid capital, industry concentration, and the extent of industry regulation (e.g., Grier et al, 1994;Hillman, 2003;Macher et al, 2011;Macher & Mayo, 2012;Weymouth, 2012). Economic sociologists have provided evidence that political activity is also shaped by the Blacklisted Benefactors 3 dense social networks that connect organizations and the managerial elite (e.g., Mizruchi, 1989;Burris, 2005).…”