The World Bank–United States–Latin American Triangle: The Negotiations with Socialist Chile, 1970–1973

Multilateral Loans, Banking Finance, and the Martínez De Hoz Plan in Argentina, 1976-1981

“…Foreign financial regulatory bodies and monetary authorities did not have the power to regulate bankers’ overseas lending operations in order to sustain sound institutions and avoid systemic risks and market instabilities (Frydl 1979-1980; Carlozzi 1981; Schenk 2010; Altamura 2015). The Fund had to concede that it could not control deficit countries’ all-too-easy banking loans which delayed indispensable economic stabilisation policies (Witteveen 1976; Helleiner 1985, 1994; James 2005; Schenk 2006, 2010). After the 1973-1974 oil crisis, therefore, all of them welcomed the recycling of petrodollars as an effective, efficient and timely relief for the balance of payment problems of oil-importing nations.…”

“…Debates, however, have ignored substantial relevant inroads of historians, economists, sociologists, and political scientists in the history of international banking, capital markets, institutional and policy changes of multilateral lending agencies, and the internal dynamics and power struggles of the military dictatorship, international financiers, and the U.S. government (Battilossi 2000;Novaro and Palermo 2003;Canelo 2004Canelo , 2008Heredia 2004;Babb 2009;Cassis 2010;Chwieroth 2010;Altamura 2015;Avenburg 2015;Sharma 2017). They have also lagged behind recent pioneer studies by historians, sociologists, and economists on the rise of neoliberalism, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) policies, Washington's regional concerns, and Latin American crossborder financial intermediation leading to the foreign debt collapses of the late 1970s and the early 1980s in Mexico and Chile (Babb 2001(Babb , 2009Alvarez 2015Alvarez , 2017Kedar 2015Kedar , 2017aKershaw 2017). Their input, the opening of Argentine and foreign archives, and a closer look at unused sources, allow an update of previous debates in more sophisticated terms.…”

The World Bank Lending and Non-Lending to Latin America: The Case of Argentina, 1971-1976

“…For example, at the same time, the WB and Salvador Allende's regime in Chile were conducting high-ranking but unproductive negotiations. In that instance, notwithstanding ideological disagreement and Chile's refusal to adopt WB recommendations, LAC never even mentioned the possibility of stopping disbursements on loans that had been approved before Allende's inauguration (Kedar 2016). Thus, trying to avoid an almost inevitable and certainly harmful freeze in WB lending and disbursements, in March 1972, Carlos Brignone, Argentina's Central Bank president and Ambassador Muñiz, met McNamara, Alter and Burke Knapp (WB vice president and chair of the Loan Committee).…”

“…To begin with, it enabled the WB to continue interacting with regimes of different natures and ideological stands. Hence, during the 1970s, the WB conducted negotiations with Peronist Argentina and socialist Chile, but also with right-wing and U.S.-friendly dictatorships in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, to name just a few (Kedar 2016). In addition, it was precisely these constant interactions with substantially different regimes that allowed the WB to portray itself as «neutral», thereby securing its reputation and legitimacy among Latin American borrowers.…”

The Return of International Finance and the Martínez de Hoz Plan in Argentina, 1976–1978

“…They also sidestepped relevant literature on the policies and institutional changes in multilateral lending agencies (see for example Babb 2009;Sharma 2013bSharma , 2017Gould 2006;Vreeland 2003;Copelovitch 2010;Chwieroth 2008Chwieroth , 2010. The input of these recent scholarly perspectives, as well as a closer look at other unused sources such as the recent memoirs of Martínez de Hoz, adds to our understanding of the Argentine case and catches up debates on the international financial relations of Mexico and Chile from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system to the outbreak of the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s (Kedar 2015(Kedar , 2017a(Kedar , 2017b(Kedar , 2018aAlvarez 2015Alvarez , 2017Alvarez , 2018Kershaw 2018).…”