The Winners and Losers of 2003: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Change*

Military Conflict and Neo-Liberalization in Israel (2001–2006): A Neo-Gramscian Approach

“…7. As Shalev and Levy (2005) point out, this was also a result of strengthening "patriotism." This would indicate in fact an even stronger support for the Project from the middle class Mizrachim.…”

“…Most of the main approaches that analyze Israeli society have difficulties in providing a comprehensive answer to this combination. These difficulties arise either because of the tendency to consider the relationship between the symbolic dimension and social groups as relatively fixed (Ben-Porat, 2005;Ram, 2008;Shafir and Peled, 2002), because of assuming that the material dimension has a determinant role (Peled, 2008;Shafir and Peled, 2002), or because they focus on specific aspects such as society-military relations or electoral behavior (Cohen, 2000(Cohen, , 2006Levy, 2007aLevy, , 2007bShalev and Levy, 2005). By explaining the above-mentioned combination as the emergence of a hegemonic project sustained by the consolidation of a historical bloc led by business and military elites and connecting Ashkenazim with most other Jewish social groups, NGA provides a better framework for analyzing the intersection between politics, economics, and society during this period.…”

“…The rise of the Shinui party in the 2003 elections is particularly indicative of this change-cum-continuation. Shinui’s representation in parliament grew from 6 to 15 seats following a nationalist, neo-liberal, and anti-religious campaign which attracted mainly Ashkenazim (Peled, 2004; Shalev and Levy, 2005). This was not a temporal or party-dependent phenomenon.…”

“…In the 2003 elections, Sharon’s Likud doubled its seats in parliament and became the largest party, winning twice as much seats as the second largest party, Labor. A significant part of this strength was derived from the more affluent sections of the Mizrachi group who deserted Shas and from IFSU who deserted the sectorial Israel BaAliyah (Al-Haj, 2004; Shalev and Levy, 2005). The latter party merged with Likud promptly after the elections.…”

“…If liberalization was so beneficial to Ashkenazim, why did they support a hard-line response to the Palestinian uprising that could jeopardize the neo-liberal economy? (see Shalev and Levy, 2005).…”