“…These temporary, small-scale new rules are, in turn, evaluated after a specified amount of time, and depending on the results, the legal framework is transformed in light of these findings [12,32].…”
Section: Experimentation As Tool For Developing Novel Legislationmentioning
Moving towards a low-carbon society calls not only for technological innovation, but also for new modes of governance. However, the current legal framework of the electricity sector, and the modes of governance that it establishes, impede innovation in the sector. To overcome this obstacle, in 2015 the Dutch government adopted a Crown decree for experiments with decentralized renewable electricity generation (Experimentation Decree) with the aim to generate insights on how to adjust the legal framework. The question remains whether regulation is being adopted to real-life settings, i.e., which lessons can be learned from experimentally acquired results regarding new modes of governance for decentralized electricity systems? To answer this question we apply an interdisciplinary approach: we investigate which modes of governance are established in the Experimentation Decree (legal research) and which ones are implemented in nine projects (governance research). Under the Decree, associations have to carry out all tasks in the electricity supply chain and can engage in collective generation, peer-to-peer supply and system operation. Other modes of governance, new actors for emerging activities and consumer involvement are limited. We conclude that the Experimentation Decree is too restricted regarding new modes of governance for a decentralized electricity system in real-life settings.
“…These temporary, small-scale new rules are, in turn, evaluated after a specified amount of time, and depending on the results, the legal framework is transformed in light of these findings [12,32].…”
Section: Experimentation As Tool For Developing Novel Legislationmentioning
Moving towards a low-carbon society calls not only for technological innovation, but also for new modes of governance. However, the current legal framework of the electricity sector, and the modes of governance that it establishes, impede innovation in the sector. To overcome this obstacle, in 2015 the Dutch government adopted a Crown decree for experiments with decentralized renewable electricity generation (Experimentation Decree) with the aim to generate insights on how to adjust the legal framework. The question remains whether regulation is being adopted to real-life settings, i.e., which lessons can be learned from experimentally acquired results regarding new modes of governance for decentralized electricity systems? To answer this question we apply an interdisciplinary approach: we investigate which modes of governance are established in the Experimentation Decree (legal research) and which ones are implemented in nine projects (governance research). Under the Decree, associations have to carry out all tasks in the electricity supply chain and can engage in collective generation, peer-to-peer supply and system operation. Other modes of governance, new actors for emerging activities and consumer involvement are limited. We conclude that the Experimentation Decree is too restricted regarding new modes of governance for a decentralized electricity system in real-life settings.
“…Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation ; Veit & Jantz ; Xanthaki ; Department for Business Information and Skills ; EU Inter‐institutional Agreement on Better Law‐Making ). Temporary legislation is likewise considered to be an essential component of experimental regulation, as scholars agree that “an experimental law or regulation must have an ab initio limited duration” (Ranchordás , p. 419; Van Gestel & Van Dijck ; Gubler ). Hence, temporary legislation is often hailed as a central tool for both experimentalist governance and better regulation (European Political Strategy Centre, ).…”
Section: Experimentalist Governance Better Regulation and Temporarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Experimental legislation “is adopted for the express purpose of generating data prior to the sunset” that legislators or “regulators subsequently take into account in determining whether to adopt the rule,” whereas other types of temporary laws are enacted for other purposes, such as responding to emergencies or some temporary problem that is expected to pass (Gersen ; Gubler , p. 141). The second characteristic of experimental legislation is an ex post evaluation or learning mechanism, which is the most crucial component: The performance of an evaluation… is an essential feature of any experimental law since the main idea behind experimental laws is to try out a new legal regime, see if it works and learn from the observed positive and negative effects (Ranchordás , p. 420).…”
Section: Experimentalist Governance Better Regulation and Temporarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The performance of an evaluation… is an essential feature of any experimental law since the main idea behind experimental laws is to try out a new legal regime, see if it works and learn from the observed positive and negative effects (Ranchordás , p. 420).…”
Section: Experimentalist Governance Better Regulation and Temporarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, while other temporary laws are primarily tools for policy termination and are therefore meant to expire, experimental laws are intended to be a first step toward permanent legislation: “new rules are enacted on an experimental basis, their effects and side‐effects are evaluated, and should these rules prove to be effective, they can be adapted and converted into permanent laws” (Ranchordás , p. 419; Van Gestel & Van Dijck ).…”
Section: Experimentalist Governance Better Regulation and Temporarymentioning
This article presents the findings of an extensive multi‐method empirical study that explored the relationship between temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. Temporary (or “sunset”) legislation – statutory provisions enacted for a limited time and set to expire unless their validity is extended – is often hailed as a key tool for promoting experimental and better regulation. Despite the importance of temporary legislation and the burgeoning theoretical scholarship on the subject, there is still a dearth of empirical studies about how temporary legislation is used in practice. The lack of empirical evidence creates a lacuna in at least three areas of theoretical scholarship, concerning temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. This paper is a first step to fill this gap.
Agencies involved in generating regulatory policies promote evidence‐based regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) to improve the predictability of regulation and develop informed policy. Here, we analyze the epistemic foundations of RIAs. We frame RIA as reasoning that connects various types of knowledge to inferences about the future. Drawing on Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation, we situate deductive and inductive reasoning steps within a schema we call the impact argument. This approach helps us identify inherent uncertainties in RIAs, and their location in different types of reasoning. We illustrate the theoretical section with impact assessments of two recent legislative proposals produced by the European Commission. We argue that the concept of “evidence‐based regulatory impact assessment” is misleading and should be based on the notion of “regulatory impact assessment as evidential reasoning,” which better recognizes its processual and argumentative nature.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
