The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations: Integrating Agency Independence and Appointee Ideology

Abstract

In recent years, scholars have expended considerable efforts to understand the executive appointment process and the forces influencing the choices made by the president and the Senate. However, some factors integral to theoretical models have not been well integrated empirically, and other relevant factors have not been incorporated much at all. Here, we focus on one determinant corresponding to the former critique—nominee ideology—and another corresponding to the latter—the independence of decision makers in the targeted agencies. We examine a series of theoretically driven hypotheses regarding the effects of both ideology and independence on who gets nominated and if and when nominees are eventually confirmed. Results show nominee ideology and decision maker independence matter a great deal and factor into presidential strategic choices and senatorial responses in ways according to expectations. Our findings have important ramifications for understanding appointments empirically and for future theoretical development.

The Contemporary Presidency: The “Nuclear Option” Has Fizzled, Again: Here's Why and What to Do about It

“…McCarty and Razaghian explain the lengthening Senate deliberations as resulting from “the super‐majoritarianism of the Senate … [which] gives partisan and ideological minorities a strategic opportunity to have an impact on public policy by delaying nominations that would pass on a simple majority vote” (1999, 1125). This explanation also informs Ostrander's (2015) recent analysis of contemporary appointments and Hollibaugh and Rothenberg's (2018) model of presidential nominations. In all these theoretical models, senators in the minority oppose the president’s nominees on policy grounds—the more polarized the parties, the stronger their opposition.…”

“…As it turns out, political scientists largely endorse this logic. Much theoretical work in the field has concentrated on the growing divide between the parties, arguing that this growing partisanship foments the obstructionism that senators complain about (Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018; Ostrander 2015; McCarty 2000; Primo, Binder, and Maltzman 2008).…”

The Structure of Appointment Politics: Consistency or Change?

“…The post‐World War II era is also notable in that expectations of presidential activity in the early days of an administration were radically transformed by Franklin Roosevelt's “first hundred days” (Schlesinger 1958), with subsequent presidents finding themselves held to standards of high productivity during analogous timeframes. In contemporary times, presidents are expected to have 100‐day plans for staffing key positions (Johnson 2008) and to target different types of agencies for nominations during earlier parts of the administration (Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018). These factors jointly imply the nominations process should change over the course of administrations, and post‐Roosevelt expectations suggest the magnitude of the change ought to be larger after World War II.…”

“…For studies covering relatively short periods, such as a few decades, this seems defensible (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 2009; Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018; O'Connell 2015; Ostrander 2016). 4 However, there is more reason to pause when investigating longer timespans.…”

Appointments and attrition: time and executive disadvantage in the appointments process

“…See Selin (2015) for an overview, and Hollibaugh (2018) and Hollibaugh and Rothenberg (2018) for specific discussions, of how removal power restrictions might affect the nomination process.…”