The West that is not in the West: identifying the self in Oriental modernity

Abstract

This paper discusses the meaning of 'the West' in Chinese and Japanese political discourse. It argues that for Japanese and Chinese political thinkers, the West does not exist in the West. Rather, the West is sometimes at the periphery and, at other times, at the centre. For them, 'the Chinese' is about the epistemology of all-under-heaven. There is no such concept as 'Other' in this epistemology. As a result, modern Western thinkers depend on opposing the concrete, historical, yet backward Other to pretend to be universal, while Chinese and Japanese thinkers concentrate on self-rectification to compete for the best representative of 'the Chinese' in world politics. 'The Chinese' is no more than an epistemological frame that divides the world into the centre and the periphery. In modern times, the Japanese have accepted Japan as being at the periphery of world politics, while the West is at the centre. To practise self-rectification is to simulate the West. The West is therefore not the geographical West, but at the centre of Japanese selfhood. Self-knowledge produced through Othering and that through self-rectification are so different that the universal West could not make sense of the all-under-heaven way of conceptualizing the West.

Reconstructing hierarchy as the key international relations concept and its implications for the study of Japanese national identity

“…As Shih points out, Japan's invasion of Russia in 1904/1905 was precisely guided by Japan's quest for appraisal by Western powers. ‘The Japanese government was thrilled by the opportunity of becoming a party of balance of power which presumably only modern nations were eligible for participation’ (Shih, 2010: 552). Western powers were slow and cautious in embracing Japan's power status.…”

“…In this sense, Japan's involvement in the World War II was not only due to its perception of superiority in Asia, but also in its perception of inferiority toward the West. ‘The bitter victory in the Russo-Japanese war inspired Japan into all-round involvement in the so-called China Theatre, where supposedly only European nations were entitled to play in the balance of power’ (Shih, 2010: 552–553).…”

The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations

“…Moreover, China would allegedly have no messianism of exporting one ultimate value or system to the outside world, and such general passivity — the absence of any missionary impulse to export and impose — is also held to be rooted in China’s cultural precept of ‘leading by example’ ultimately traceable to Confucius’s idea of exemplification (Yü, 2004: 251), in contrast to the Western one of ‘domination by spiritual or military conquest.’ Whereas Western powers claimed a mission civilisatrice in terms of a mission to spread their ideas to the rest of the world, traditional China, it is argued, did not consider its responsibility, let alone mission, to actively transform the yi (culturally inferior foreign peoples) into the hua (cultural Chinese). 8 If the transformation occurred, it was not because of China’s forceful imposition but because of China’s serving as a model and others’ emulation of it (Shih, 2010: 548). With an understanding of this historical and intellectual background, contemporary China asserts that, having inherited this noble legacy, it would reject missionary universalism and prefer the harmonious coexistence of all political and cultural systems.…”

“…Indeed, some observers see a direct lineage between the old precept of ‘leading by example’ and the new principle of harmonious inclusionism. The ‘harmonious world’ discourse is seen to embody China’s effort to develop itself into a sort of self-sacrificing great power for world harmony: the purpose is not to transform the world, but to create an attractive model through self-improvement so that others may be moved by China’s call for harmony and emulate it (Shih, 2010).…”

Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?

“…China's legal claim to these territories is strong, but Zhao's point is to stress the ethical legitimacy of the Tianxia model, which is lacking. The main question then is not whether China has a pattern of self ⁄ Other relations that is similar to the West (or not) (Shih 2007), but how the Tianxia system addresses difference. Because Zhao figures his Tianxia system as ''all-inclusive,'' any difference risks being converted into the sameness of the overarching (Chinese) self.…”