The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories

Bunge, Mario

doi:10.1086/287794

Cited by 72 publications

(34 citation statements)

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“…My classification scheme has some commonalities with distinctions proposed in the literature (such asRudner 1961;Bunge 1961Bunge , 1962Hesse 1967;Baker 2011; Schulz 2012, among others), but given the different purposes and contexts, it is clearly different from them.…”

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confidence: 84%

Simple is not easy

Barrios

2015

Synthese

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I review and challenge the views on simplicity and its role in linguistics put forward by Ludlow (The philosophy of generative linguistics, 2011). In particular, I criticize the claim that simplicity-in the sense pertinent to science-is nothing more than ease of use or "user-friendliness", motivated by economy of (cognitive) labor. I argue that Ludlow's discussion fails to do justice to the diversity of factors that are relevant to simplicity considerations. This, in turn, leads to the neglect of crucial cases in which the rationale for simplification is unmistakably epistemic, as well as instances where simplicity is part of the content of substantive, empirical hypotheses. I illustrate these points with examples from the history of generative linguistics, such as: (a) the shaping influence exerted by simplicity, via its involvement in the notion of "linguistically significant generalization", (b) its methodological and substantive contribution to the goal of explanatory adequacy, and (c) its central role in the Minimalist Program's search "beyond explanatory adequacy".

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confidence: 84%

Simple is not easy

Barrios

2015

Synthese

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“…But there are two fundamental problems: Firstly, it is very difficult to measure the simplicity of a particular explanation (see already Bunge, 1961). Secondly, it is by far not clear when two theories explain the same phenomena equally well.…”

Section: The Concept Of Deep Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

Gräbner

2017

Journal of Economic Issues

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Analyzing economic systems from an evolutionary-institutional or a complexity perspective are two complementary approaches to economic inquiry. Three arguments in favor of this hypothesis are discussed: (i) eminent institutional economists have considered the economy as what today could be considered a complex system; (ii) complexity economists lack meta-theoretical foundations which could be provided by institutionalist theory; (iii) institutional economists could benefit from using methods of complexity economics.In this context I argue that scholars considering the economy to be complex should seek to explain it by discovering social mechanisms instead of focusing on prediction. For the discrimination between alternative explanations, scholars should refer to the deepness of an explanation, rather than to Occam's razor.

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“…Such polysemies in alethic epistemic values are probably the norm, making the problem even harder. The concept of simplicity in the context of epistemic appraisal, for instance, appears to be a mongrel concept that designates different syntactical, semantical, epistemological, practical and aesthetic properties of constructs [141,142]. Unfortunately, most philosophical theories (and other philosophical constructs) are informal and are yet to be expressed in the regimented languages required for such computations.…”

Section: Modelling Epistemic Appraisalmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

Doria¹

2017

Philosophies

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I submit that epistemic progress in key areas of contemporary academic philosophy has been compromised by politically correct ("PC") ideology. First, guided by an evolutionary account of ideology, results from social and cognitive psychology and formal philosophical methods, I expose evidence for political bias in contemporary Western academia and sketch a formalization for the contents of beliefs from the PC worldview taken to be of core importance, the theory of social oppression and the thesis of anthropological mental egalitarianism. Then, aided by discussions from contemporary epistemology on epistemic values, I model the problem of epistemic appraisal using the frameworks of multi-objective optimization theory and multi-criteria decision analysis and apply it to politically correct philosophy. I conclude that philosophy guided by politically correct values is bound to produce constructs that are less truth-conducive and that spurious values which are ideologically motivated should be abandoned. Objections to my framework stemming from contextual empiricism, the feminine voice in ethics and political philosophy are considered. I conclude by prescribing the epistemic value of empirical adequacy, the contextual value of political diversity and the moral virtue of moral courage to reverse unwarranted trends in academic philosophy due to PC ideology.

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The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories

Cited by 72 publications

References 0 publications

Simple is not easy

Simple is not easy

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

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