The “War on Drugs” in Mexico: (Official) Database of Events between December 2006 and November 2011

Atuesta, Laura H.; Siordia, Oscar S.; Lajous, Alejandro Madrazo

doi:10.1177/0022002718817093

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…We use negative binomial regression models, which are the most appropriate technique for count data, particularly when observations are non-independent and over-dispersedas is the case with the count of criminal attacks. We rely on random-effects models instead of fixed-effects models, because some of our key political variables (for example, the juxtaposition variables) remain 11 For a description of this database and access to the information, see Atuesta, Siordia and Madrazo Lajous (2018).…”

Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico

Trejo

Ley²

2019

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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This article explains a surprising wave of lethal attacks by drug cartels against hundreds of local elected officials and party candidates in Mexico, 2007–2012. These attacks are puzzling because criminal organizations tend to prefer the secrecy of bribery over the publicity of political murder. Scholars suggest that war drives armed actors to attack state authorities in search of protection or rents. Using original data on high-profile attacks in Mexico, the authors show that war need arguments underexplain violence. Focusing on political opportunities, they suggest that cartels use attacks to establish criminal governance regimes and conquer local governments, populations and territories. The study presents quantitative and qualitative evidence showing that cartels took advantage of Mexico's political polarization and targeted subnational authorities who were unprotected by their federal partisan rivals. Cartels intensified attacks during subnational election cycles to capture incoming governments and targeted geographically adjacent municipalities to establish control over large territories. The findings reveal how cartels take cues from the political environment to develop their own de facto political domains through high-profile violence. These results question the widely shared assumption that organized criminal groups are apolitical actors.

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Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 11 For a description of this database and access to the information, see Atuesta, Siordia and Madrazo Lajous (2018). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico

Trejo

Ley²

2019

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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“…The homicide data were provided by the 2006–2012 database of the drug policy program developed by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) (Atuesta, Siordia, and Madrazo, 2018). This database was useful for identifying the locations of drug cartels by municipality and was the only public source of municipal-level information available.…”

Section: Methodology and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybrid Governance in Northeastern Mexico: Crime, Violence, and Legal-Illegal Energy Markets

López-Vallejo¹,

Fuerte-Celis²

2020

Latin American Perspectives

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Despite the presence of organized crime in northeastern Mexico, the region has a functioning economy that attracts new investment to energy projects, especially those involving fossil fuels. This may be because legal and illegal markets there tend to overlap and function under hybrid governance schemes. The hybridization of governance is an expression of the fact that legality and illegality are embedded in contemporary capitalist markets. This embeddedness is not an abnormal condition but the way in which societies deal locally with organized crime, and violence serves as the primary regulatory mechanism in disputed territories and markets. A pesar de la presencia del crimen organizado en el noreste de México, la región tiene una economía funcional que atrae nuevas inversiones a proyectos energéticos, especialmente aquellos relacionados con combustibles fósiles. Esto puede deberse a que, ahí, los mercados legales e ilegales tienden a solaparse y funcionar en el marco de los sistemas de gobernanza híbrida. La hibridación de la gobernanza es una expresión del hecho de que la legalidad y la ilegalidad están incrustadas en los mercados capitalistas contemporáneos. Dicha incrustación no es una condición anormal, sino la forma en que las sociedades se ocupan localmente del crimen organizado, y la violencia sirve como el principal mecanismo regulador en los territorios y mercados en disputa.

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“…The CIDE-PPD Dataset records violent events that took place between December 2006 and November 2011 (Atuesta et al 2019 , p. 7). It gathers more than 36,000 events of drug related violence.…”

Section: Description Of the Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It gathers more than 36,000 events of drug related violence. The CIDE-PPD dataset contains information about confrontations, executions, and aggressions between governmental forces and criminal organizations as well as the casualties generated in those confrontations (Atuesta et al 2011). The CIDE-PPD database has been used to study messages in narcomantas left by DTOs (Atuesta 2017), DTOs geographical areas of influence (del Fuerte Celis 2016), violence against journalists (Guerra 2016), the effect of the governmental intervention in the rise of violence in Mexico (Atuesta and Ponce 2017), and the effect that drug related violence has on the mental health of indirect victims of violence (Flores and Atuesta 2018).…”

Section: The Cide-ppd Datasetmentioning

confidence: 99%

The perfect storm. An analysis of the processes that increase lethal violence in Mexico after 2006

Martínez¹,

Phillips²

2021

Trends Organ Crim

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Research on ‘the War on Drugs’ in Mexico finds that military interventions increase lethal violence in the country. However, these studies fail to account for other processes that may be driving the behavior of lethal violence in the Mexican municipalities. We find confirmation that these rival processes influence the relative impact that military interventions have on lethal violence. In particular, we find that seasonality in violence, competition for scarce resources and PAN’s governance in the municipalities are associated with higher levels of lethal violence, as measured by the young male homicide rate. We argue that the literature may have overestimated the effect that military interventions have in lethal violence in municipalities and that other drivers of violence should be taken into account to accurately measure the impact that military interventions have on lethal violence.

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The “War on Drugs” in Mexico: (Official) Database of Events between December 2006 and November 2011

Cited by 18 publications

References 10 publications

High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico

High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico

Hybrid Governance in Northeastern Mexico: Crime, Violence, and Legal-Illegal Energy Markets

The perfect storm. An analysis of the processes that increase lethal violence in Mexico after 2006

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