The Wage–wage‐ . . . ‐wage–profit Relation in a Multisector Bargaining Economy

Abstract

The equalization of profit rates across industries subject to firm-level bargaining over wages generates an interindustry wage structure with higher wages in capital-intensive sectors. The familiar inverse wage-profit relation gives way to a wage-wage-. . . -wage-profit surface on which the profit rate can vary directly with the wage paid in an individual industry. Institutional changes that decrease workers' bargaining power and increase the incomes of the unemployed tend to compress the wage distribution; these changes draw political support from cross-class coalitions of low-wage workers and capitalintensive firms. Some capital-using, labor-saving technical changes that raise capitalists' profits in current prices lower the equilibrium profit rate.me ca_355 537..559

Improvement of the method for calculation of bonus payments of employees at mining stations of coal mines

“…Проблема визначення форми оплати праці досліджу-валася, зокрема авторами праць [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15], які узагальнили теоретичні засади та практичний досвід у сфері оплати праці на промислових підприємствах, але все ж таки питання щодо дослідження економічних підходів з ура-хуванням особливостей у вугільній галузі і перш за все на видобувних дільницях потребує подальшого вивчення і деталізації.…”

Endogenous income distribution in the Bhaduri-Marglin model

“…Endogenous determinations of the real wage rate can e.g. be found in Lavoie (1992), Cassetti (2003), Lima (2004), Taylor (2004), Barbosa-Filho/ Taylor (2006), Raghavendra (2006) and Julius (2009). output.…”

“…5 In order to keep the model as illustrative as possible we abstain from a detailed modeling of the wage bargaining process as it can be found in other models (see e.g. Lavoie 1992, Cassetti 2003, Lima 2004and Julius 2009. Rather we will include a very simple relation capturing the empirically observed outcome of this rather complex bargaining process, which is a pro-cyclical real wage rate (see Raghavendra 2006 andSwanson 2007):…”

Effort Elicitation, Wage Differentials and Income Distribution in A Wage‐Led Growth Regime

“…In the model set forth in van de Klundert (), for instance, there is a primary sector where labor efficiency depends on the intersectoral wage differential, which is endogenous, along with a secondary sector where there is no such dependence. Meanwhile, Julius () explores the wage distributions which emerge from bargaining in a circulating‐capital economy. One interesting result is that if many goods are produced by goods and labor, a simple, Nash bargaining mechanism is enough to cause indistinguishable workers to be paid different wages.…”